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On June 23, 2011, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down Stern v. Marshall,
1
 which has quickly become the hottest 
topic in bankruptcy law in quite some time. This Article (1) briefly 
describes the historical authority of bankruptcy courts; (2) 
discusses the Supreme Court’s ruling and rationale in Stern; and 
(3) discusses the ramifications of Stern through the lens of recent 
case law discussing Stern, as well as other issues that have not yet 
been addressed by the courts. As will be shown in this Article, the 
majority’s pronouncements in Stern have led lower courts to 
widely disparate conclusions about the breadth of the Stern 
decision, and those pronouncements have also dealt a significant 
blow to the foundational authority of bankruptcy courts, the full 
effects of which have not yet come to fruition. At least for now, the 
United States bankruptcy system is still running, despite an unclear 
foundation for doing so.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 1. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
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I. BANKRUPTCY COURT AUTHORITY 
A. Pre-Bankruptcy Code 
In the beginning, there was debtors’ prison. As a vestige of 
British practice (which itself derived from ancient and medieval 
practices), as late as the early 19th Century in the United States, 
debtors were often imprisoned for unpaid debts. However, because 
the U.S. Constitution, enacted in 1789, provided for Congressional 
authority to create laws on the subject of bankruptcies,
2
 Congress 
made attempts at creating a federal bankruptcy law in response to 
the increasing unpopularity of debtors’ prison.3 Prior to 1898, 
Congress passed three Bankruptcy Acts: one in 1800 (set in motion 
by a depression beginning in 1793), which was repealed three 
years later; one in 1841 (set in motion by the Panic of 1837), which 
was repealed two years later; and one in 1867 (set in motion by the 
Panic of 1857), which was amended in 1874 and finally repealed in 
1878.
4
 In the meantime, most states had insolvency laws, which 
operated in the absence of federal bankruptcy law.
5
 After those 
three failed attempts, Congress then enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898.
6
  
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, bankruptcy jurisdiction 
was conferred on “courts of bankruptcy,” “court” was 
defined to mean “the judge or referee of the court of 
bankruptcy,” and “courts of bankruptcy” to “include” the 
district judges. That Act gave the referees jurisdiction, 
subject to review by a district judge, to perform all duties 
conferred on “courts of bankruptcy” as distinguished from 
those conferred on “judges,” which were to be performed 
only by district judges. Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1973 redesignated 
the referees as “bankruptcy judges.”7  
Under the 1898 Act, “referees” were appointed by district 
courts for six year terms; were removable for “incompetence, 
                                                                                                             
 2. See Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution, which authorizes 
Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout 
the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 3. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION, A HISTORY OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 25 (2001). 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Vern Countryman, The Bankruptcy Judges: Jurisdiction by Neglect, 92 
COM. L.J. 1, n. 1 (1987).  
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misconduct, or neglect of duty”; were given fixed compensation 
that “could be increased but not reduced by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States,” which was payable from a fund 
made up of fees and levies from bankruptcy estates; and were so 
called because “a wide variety of cases under the old Act were 
referred to them.”8  
Courts of bankruptcy under the 1898 Act had summary 
jurisdiction over three areas.
9
 First, they had “exclusive jurisdiction 
over ‘matters of administration’” in the bankruptcy case (including 
petitions; the bankruptcy res; the allowance, rejection, and 
reconsideration of claims; the reduction of claims to money; the 
“determination of preferences and priorities to be accorded to 
claims presented for payment”; supervision of trustees; the 
granting of discharges; and the confirmation of debt adjustment 
plans).
10
 Second, they had jurisdiction to decide “controversies 
over property in the actual or constructive possession of the 
court.”11 Finally, “other actions by the trustee [were to] be brought 
only in courts where the bankrupt could have brought [them] in the 
absence of bankruptcy, unless by consent of the defendant[s].”12  
B. The Bankruptcy Code 
In 1978, the Bankruptcy Code came into being. The 
Bankruptcy Code eliminated the referee system under the old Act 
and established “in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the 
district court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be a 
court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the district.”13 Judges of the newly formed bankruptcy courts were 
“appointed to office for 14-year terms by the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate” and were “subject to removal by 
the ‘judicial council of the circuit’ on account of ‘incompetency, 
                                                                                                             
 8. Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The 
Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1985).  
 9. Id. at 3. This summary jurisdiction exists in contrast to a district court’s 
plenary jurisdiction. Comment, Consent to Summary Jurisdiction, 34 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 469 (1966).  
 10. Countryman, supra note 8, at 3.   
 11. Id.  
 12. Countryman, supra note 7, at 1–2; see also Countryman, supra note 8, 
at 3. This third subset of consent jurisdiction was subsequently irreverently 
referred to as “jurisdiction by ambush” when by Bankruptcy Act amendments in 
1952, the absence of objection to summary jurisdiction was deemed consent. 
Countryman, supra note 8, at 5–6.  
 13. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 
(1982) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).  
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misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental disability.’”14 
Further, “the salaries of the bankruptcy judges are set by statute 
and are subject to adjustment under the Federal Salary Act.”15  
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code did not vest bankruptcy court 
authority in Article III judges; however originally it was presumed 
Article III judges would preside over bankruptcy courts. 
The federal commission that produced the first draft of what 
became the new Bankruptcy Code recommended that the 
jurisdiction problems under the old Act be eliminated by 
giving bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over “all controversies 
that arise out of a bankruptcy case” without regard to 
possession of property or the consent of the defendant. 
Essentially, Congress adopted that recommendation, 
although an effort by the House to elevate bankruptcy judges 
to Article III status failed.
16
  
The jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Code was 
“broader than that exercised under the former referee system,” 
eliminated “the distinction between ‘summary’ and ‘plenary’ 
jurisdiction,” and instead granted bankruptcy courts “jurisdiction 
over all ‘civil proceedings arising under title 11 . . . or arising in or 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a)–(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).  
 15. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 351–61 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); 28 U.S.C. § 154 
(1976 ed., Supp. IV)).  
 16. Countryman, supra note 7, at 3–4 (internal citations omitted). The 
Supreme Court in Marathon also explained that:  
It should be noted, however, that the House of Representatives 
expressed substantial doubts respecting the constitutionality of the 
provisions eventually included in the Act. The House Judiciary 
Committee and its Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights 
gave lengthy consideration to the constitutional issues surrounding the 
conferral of broad powers upon the new bankruptcy courts. The 
Committee, the Subcommittee, and the House as a whole initially 
concluded that Art. III courts were constitutionally required for 
bankruptcy adjudications. The Senate bankruptcy bill did not provide 
for life tenure or a guaranteed salary, instead adopting the concept of a 
bankruptcy court with similarly broad powers but as an “adjunct” to an 
Art. III court. The bill that was finally enacted, denying bankruptcy 
judges the tenure and compensation protections of Art. III, was the 
result of a series of last-minute conferences and compromises between 
the managers of both Houses.  
458 U.S. at n.12 (citations omitted). See also Louis W. Levit and Richard J. 
Mason, Where Do We Go From Here? Bankruptcy Administration Post-
Marathon, 87 COM. L.J. 353, 354 (1982) (“The House bill, however, 
encountered substantial objection on policy grounds. To meet those objections, 
the Senate produced bill S.2266 whereunder the status of the new court was 
reduced to that of a non-tenured adjunct of the district court.”).  
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related to cases under title 11.”17 Under that umbrella, bankruptcy 
courts could hear claims based on state law as well as on federal 
law.
18
 Under the 1978 Code, appeals from bankruptcy courts were 
to be heard by three-bankruptcy-judge-panels (pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 160) or, if no panel had been appointed by the chief 
circuit judge, by the district court (under 28 U.S.C. § 1334); the 
court of appeals then had jurisdiction over appeals from the 
appellate panels or the district court (under 28 U.S.C. § 1293); 
however, there was also an option for direct appeal to the court of 
appeals from a final order of a bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1293(b).
19
  
C. Marathon 
Bankruptcy court authority came under attack in Northern 
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
20
 
(Marathon), decided by the Supreme Court on June 28, 1982, and 
which resulted in a ruling that the broad grant of jurisdiction to 
bankruptcy judges under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was 
unconstitutional. Four justices of the Supreme Court concluded 
that “the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts 
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed. Supp. IV) is 
unconstitutional” and explained that: 
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed. Supp. IV), as added by § 241(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed 
most, if not all, of “the essential attributes of the judicial 
power” from the Art. III district court, and has vested those 
attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of 
jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress’ 
power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.
21
 
In reaching that conclusion, the four justices reasoned that 
bankruptcy courts were not authorized as Article I legislative 
courts (specifically, they did not fall within any of the recognized 
exceptions, namely the “public rights” exception, to required 
Article III adjudication), nor were they authorized as adjuncts of 
Article III courts because bankruptcy judges wield too much 
                                                                                                             
 17. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 54 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV)).  
 18. Id. (citing 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01, at 3-47 to 3-48 (15th ed. 
1982)).  
 19. Id. at 55. 
 20. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 21. Id. at 87. 
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power.
22
 Two additional justices, in a concurring opinion, reasoned 
instead that only “so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as 
enables a [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt to entertain and decide” Northern’s 
state law contract action was “violative of Article III of the United 
States Constitution.”23 However, because these two justices 
believed that grant of authority to bankruptcy courts under 28 
U.S.C. § 1471 was not severable from the remaining grant of 
authority to bankruptcy courts, they concurred in the judgment, 
ruling the Bankruptcy Code’s grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy 
courts unconstitutional.  
D. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 
After Marathon, district courts adopted an interim “Emergency 
Rule,” which allowed bankruptcy courts to continue to function 
until an appropriate Congressional solution could be reached.
24
 
When Congress legislatively responded to Marathon 
(approximately two years later), it did so by the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (“BAFJA”) in 
which bankruptcy courts were not given Article III status; instead, 
“Congress undertook in a new Section 157 of the Judicial Code to 
specify what [bankruptcy courts] can do.”25 In fact, the Emergency 
Rule “provided a basis for what was eventually adopted as 28 
U.S.C. § 157.”26 28 U.S.C. § 1334 confers jurisdiction on district 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. at 76, 86. 
 23. Id. at 91.  
 24. Countryman, supra note 7, at 6. Indeed, the Supreme Court had stayed 
its judgment in Marathon for just over a mere three months in order to “afford 
Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other 
valid means of adjudication.” Levit & Mason, supra note 14, at 353. “The 
emergency rule was initiated by the Judicial Conference of the United States in 
September 1982 by a resolution requiring the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts to promulgate a rule for use by the circuits in 
the event that Congress failed to act by the end of the stay in Marathon.” Jeffrey 
T. Ferriell, Core Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, 56 UMKC L. REV. 47, n. 74 
(1987) (citing Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of Proceedings 
91 (Sept. 1982)).  
 25. Countryman, supra note 7, at 6.  
 26. One commentator has explained:   
Like 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the emergency rule provided for reference of 
“[all] cases under Title 11 and all civil proceedings arising under Title 
11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11 . . . to the bankruptcy 
judges of th[e] district.” The bankruptcy judge was empowered to enter 
final orders and judgments in all proceedings other than those 
designated as “related proceedings[, which were the province of the 
district court].”  
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courts (a) “originally and exclusively over bankruptcy cases” and 
(b) “originally but not exclusively over all civil proceedings arising 
under the Bankruptcy Code or ‘arising in or related to’ a 
bankruptcy case.”27 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) allows district courts to 
refer this jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges, and all district courts 
have done so, with most if not all such referrals being 
accomplished by a general order of reference from the district 
court.
28
 28 U.S.C. § 157 provides for two types of bankruptcy 
court adjudications: (1) decisions subject to appellate review by a 
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and § 158(a)(1) (“core” 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 
11) and (2) decisions subject to de novo review under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(c)(1) (“non-core” proceedings otherwise related to a case 
under title 11) in which the bankruptcy judge is to submit proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. 
Although the Bankruptcy Code has been amended a number of 
times since 1984, bankruptcy court adjudicatory authority has not 
been undermined since Marathon until Stern.  
With this brief summary of the history of bankruptcy court 
authority in mind, we now turn to Stern, which unearthed certain 
lingering Marathon concerns by its ruling unconstitutional, as 
violative of Article III of the Constitution, the exercise of 
bankruptcy court authority over certain “core” proceedings, at least 
in certain circumstances, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).  
II. STERN V. MARSHALL 
A. Majority Opinion 
In a 5 to 4 split, the majority
29
 in Stern held, as applied to the 
facts of that case, that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) is unconstitutional. 
Section 157(b)(2)(C) provides that: 
                                                                                                             
 
Ferriell, supra note 24, at 57. The validity of the Emergency Rule was brought 
into serious doubt, but under the circumstances, in that state of emergency, 
everyone appeared to play along until Congress enacted BAFJA in 1984. Id. at 59.  
 27. Countryman, supra note 7, at 6.  
 28. Id.; Allen B. Kamp, Court Structure Under the Bankruptcy Code, 90 
COM. L. J. 203, 208 (1985).  
 29. The majority consists of Roberts, writing for the Court, joined by Scalia 
(who also wrote a concurring opinion), Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Breyer 
filed a dissenting opinion in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.  
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(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases 
under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 
11, or arising in a case under title 11 . . .  
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to –  
… 
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing 
claims against the estate.
30
  
Specifically, the majority held that the bankruptcy court lacked the 
constitutional authority, even though it had the statutory authority, 
to enter judgment on a state-law counterclaim/common law tort 
claim, explaining: “Article III of the Constitution provides that the 
judicial power of the United States may be vested only in courts 
whose judges enjoy the protections set forth in that Article. We 
conclude today that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded 
that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984.”31 Thus, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit and concluded that the 
bankruptcy court’s exercise of its core jurisdiction pursuant to 
§ 157(b)(2)(C) was unconstitutional because the “Bankruptcy 
Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final 
judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the 
process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”32 The majority 
also stated its rationale another way at the outset of the opinion: 
“The Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the judicial power of 
the United States by entering final judgment on a common law tort 
claim, even though the judges of such courts enjoy neither tenure 
during good behavior nor salary protection.”33  
This case arose out of longstanding litigation between Vickie 
Lynn Marshall (also known as Anna Nicole Smith, now deceased) 
and Pierce Marshall, the son of Vickie’s former husband, J. 
Howard Marshall (also now deceased).
34
 After J. Howard’s death, 
Vickie filed for bankruptcy, and Pierce filed a complaint seeking a 
declaration and also filed a proof of claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy 
proceeding for defamation based upon allegations that Vickie 
induced her lawyers to tell the press that Pierce engaged in fraud in 
controlling J. Howard’s assets. Vickie defended by asserting 
“truth” and filed a counterclaim to the proof of claim alleging 
Pierce’s tortious interference, asserting that Pierce fraudulently 
induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that did not include Vickie 
                                                                                                             
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2006).  
 31. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011). 
 32. Id.   
 33. Id. at 2601.  
 34. The attached Appendix A is a chart detailing the procedural history of 
the Stern case, which is described in more detail herein.  
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even though J. Howard meant to give her half of his property.
35
 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the bankruptcy court
36
 found 
Vickie’s counterclaim to be a “core proceeding,” and rendered 
summary judgment against Pierce on his defamation claim and, in 
a bench trial, awarded Vickie over $400 million in compensatory 
damages and $25 million in punitive damages on her 
counterclaim.
37
 Pierce appealed.  
The district court
38
 disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s 
determination that the counterclaim was a “core” proceeding and 
believed that “it would be unconstitutional to hold that any and all 
counterclaims are core.”39 The district court then held that the 
counterclaim was not “core” and accordingly considered the 
bankruptcy court’s ruling to be proposed rather than final (pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)) and conducted an independent review of 
the record.
40
 By that time, a Texas probate court (in which Vickie 
had sued Pierce asserting tortious interference and in which Pierce 
had counterclaimed for defamation) had conducted a jury trial on 
the merits of the parties’ dispute and had entered judgment in 
Pierce’s favor,41 but the district court declined to give it preclusive 
effect and instead ruled in Vickie’s favor on the counterclaim and 
awarded her compensatory and punitive damages of 
$44,292,767.33.
42
 An appeal on a different ground
43
 was 
previously taken, was reversed by the Ninth Circuit,
44
 and was 
reversed again by the Supreme Court.
45
 On remand from the 
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 157 
mandated “a ‘two-step approach’ under which a bankruptcy judge 
may issue a final judgment in a proceeding only if the matter both 
meets Congress’s definition of a core proceeding and arises under 
                                                                                                             
 35. See infra Appendix A.   
 36. The Bankruptcy Court opinion may be found at 253 B.R. 550 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2000).  
 37. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.  
 38. The District Court opinion may be found at 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  
 39. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602.  
 40. Id.  
 41. The Texas probate court’s ruling can be found at Marshall v. MacIntyre 
(Estate of Marshall), prob. juris. noted, no. 276-815-402 (Harris Cnty., Tex. 
Dec. 7, 2001).  
 42. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602.  
 43. The first Supreme Court appeal focused on whether the probate 
exception deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over Vickie’s 
counterclaim.  
 44. The first Ninth Circuit opinion may be found at 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2004), rev’d, 54 U.S. 293 (2006).  
 45. The first Supreme Court opinion may be found at 547 U.S. 293 (2006) 
(holding that probate exception did not deprive the bankruptcy court of 
jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim).  
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or arises in title 11.”46 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that certain 
proceedings listed as “core” may not be “core” if they do not also 
arise “under or in” title 11. The Ninth Circuit found that Vickie’s 
counterclaim was not “core” because the counterclaim was not so 
closely related to Pierce’s “proof of claim that the resolution of the 
counterclaim [was] necessary to resolve the allowance or 
disallowance of the claim itself.”47 The result of the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that Vickie’s counterclaim was not core meant that the 
bankruptcy court’s order was not “final.” Therefore, the Texas 
state court’s judgment in favor of Pierce on the tortious 
interference claim was, instead, the earliest final judgment on the 
matter and was, therefore, entitled to preclusive effect.
48
  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court considered 
two main questions:  
(1) Whether the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority 
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie’s 
counterclaim; and  
(2) If so, whether conferring that authority on the Bankruptcy 
Court is constitutional.
49
  
The Court disposed of the first issue in a straightforward way. 
The Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) conferred 
statutory authority to the bankruptcy court to issue a final judgment 
on Vickie’s counterclaim and concluded that it did.50 Based upon 
the plain language of the statute, and declining to accept Pierce’s 
more convoluted readings of the statutory language, the Court 
reasoned that the “detailed list of core proceedings in § 157(b)(2) 
provides courts with ready examples” of proceedings (including 
counterclaims against persons filing claims against the estate) over 
which bankruptcy courts may exercise “core” jurisdiction.51  
The Court’s analysis of the second issue, however, undermines 
the bankruptcy court’s statutory authority recognized in the Court’s 
analysis of the first issue. As the Court explained: “Although we 
                                                                                                             
 46. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing In re Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037, 1055 
(9th Cir. 2010)).  
 47. Id. (citing Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1058). 
 48. Id. at 2602–03.  
 49. Id. at 2600. 
 50. Id. at 2608.  
 51. Id. at 2605. The Court further explained: “In past cases, we have 
suggested that a proceeding’s ‘core’ status alone authorizes a bankruptcy judge, 
as a statutory matter, to enter final judgment in the proceeding. See, e.g., 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 50 (1989) (explaining that 
Congress had designated certain actions as ‘core proceedings’ which bankruptcy 
judges may adjudicate and in which they may issue final judgments…).” Id. at 
2604.  
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conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter 
final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the 
Constitution does not.”52  
The Court’s analysis is involved, but, distilled to its essence, 
concludes that the Constitution requires that only Article III 
courts—whose judges have life tenure and are protected against 
salary reductions—decide “a suit . . . made of ‘the stuff of the 
traditional actions at common law.’”53  
The Court noted its prior decision in Marathon, in which the 
Court “considered whether bankruptcy judges serving under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978—appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, but lacking the tenure and salary 
guarantees of Article III—could ‘constitutionally be vested with 
jurisdiction to decide [a] state-law contract claim’ against an entity 
that was not otherwise part of the bankruptcy proceedings” and 
held that such jurisdiction violated Article III of the Constitution.
54
 
Similarly, in this case, the Court found the bankruptcy court’s 
exercise of “core” jurisdiction over a state common law tort claim 
unconstitutional.
55
  
1. Categorical Bases for Allowing Bankruptcy Court to Resolve 
State Common Law Claims are Inapplicable 
In supporting its ruling, the majority considered the 
applicability of various categorical bases for allowing a bankruptcy 
court, as a non-Article III tribunal, to decide state common law 
claims. The Court first went into great detail about the “public 
rights” category of cases that can be constitutionally assigned by 
Congress to Article I “legislative courts” for resolution and 
determined that Vickie’s counterclaim did not fall into the 
admittedly inconsistent various formulations of that category in the 
Court’s prior cases.56  
The Court cited Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co.
57
 for the proposition that “Congress cannot 
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its 
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or 
admiralty” but that:  
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 2608.  
 53. Id. at 2609 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)).  
 54. Id. at 2609–10 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 52, 87 n.40) 
(emphasis added).  
 55. Id. at 2611. 
 56. Id. at 2611–15.  
 57. 18 How. 272 (1856). 
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At the same time there are matters, involving public rights, 
which may be presented in such form that the judicial 
power is capable of acting on them, and which are 
susceptible of judicial determination, but which [C]ongress 
may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts 
of the United States, as it may deem proper.”58  
The Court noted, however, that the “public rights” exception was 
originally limited to instances in which the cases arise “between 
the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection 
with the performance of constitutional functions of the executive 
or legislative departments,” as opposed to private rights,59 and is 
limited by more recent jurisprudence to a case “in which the claim 
at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which 
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is 
essential” to a regulatory objective.60 The Court cited the following 
cases in that regard: 
 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932) (allowing 
administrative adjudicator to make specialized, narrow 
factual determinations regarding particularized area of law, 
with order enforceable only by district court). 
 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 
U.S. 568, 584 (1985) (statutory arbitration regarding 
compensation did not violate Article III because “[a]ny 
right to compensation . . . results from [the statute] and 
does not depend on or replace a right to such compensation 
under state law”).  
 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 
U.S. 833, 836 (1986) (CFTC jurisdiction over broker’s 
counterclaim did not violate Article III because (1) claim 
and counterclaim concerned a “single dispute;” (2) CFTC’s 
assertion of authority was “narrow” and in “particularized 
area”; (3) law in question was governed by limited federal 
regulatory scheme; (4) parties elected to resolve differences 
before CFTC; and (5) order only enforceable by order of 
the district court).  
 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54–55 
(1989) (if statutory right is not “closely intertwined with a 
federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact” 
and “if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. at 2612.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 2613.  
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Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated by an 
Article III court”).  
 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 
(2011) (what makes a right public rather than private is that 
the right is integrally related to particular federal 
government action).  
Based on the foregoing public rights exception precedent, the 
majority first explained that the substance of Vickie’s state law 
counterclaim “d[id] not flow from a federal statutory scheme.”61 
The Court also determined that that Vickie’s counterclaim was not 
“‘completely dependent upon’ adjudication of a claim created by 
federal law, as in Schor.”62 The Court further explained that 
“Pierce did not truly consent to the resolution of Vickie’s claim in 
the bankruptcy court proceedings. He had nowhere else to go if he 
wished to recover from Vickie’s estate”63  and that:  
Pierce did not have another forum in which to pursue his 
claim to recover from Vickie’s pre-bankruptcy assets, 
rather than take his chances with whatever funds might 
remain after the Title 11 proceedings. . . . as we recognized 
in Granfinanciera, the notion of “consent” does not apply 
in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in other contexts.
64
  
The Court also decided that the substance of Vickie’s claim 
was not limited to a particularized area of the law where an “expert 
and inexpensive method” for resolving it would be available (as is 
the case with certain issues given to administrative agencies 
specially assigned thereto).
65
 Instead, the Court concluded that: 
[T]his case involves the most prototypical exercise of 
judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by a 
court with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a common law 
cause of action, when the action neither derives from nor 
depends upon any agency regulatory regime. If such an 
exercise of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from 
the Article III Judiciary simply by deeming it part of some 
amorphous “public right,” then Article III would be 
transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 2614.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 2614–15 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 59 
n.14 (1989) (noting that “[p]arallel reasoning to Schor is unavailable in the 
context of bankruptcy proceedings, because creditors lack an alternative forum 
to the bankruptcy court in which to pursue their claims.”)).  
 64. Id. at n.8.  
 65. Id. at 2615 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)). 
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separation of powers we have long recognized into mere 
wishful thinking.
66
  
2. Distinguishing Katchen and Langenkamp 
Next, the Court considered Vickie’s argument that Marathon 
and Granfinanciera could be distinguished on the basis that in 
those cases, the defendants had not filed proofs of claim while 
Pierce had. Because Pierce filed a claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy 
case, she argued that the bankruptcy court had authority to 
adjudicate her counterclaim.
67
 The Court said this distinction was 
of no consequence because state law creates property interests, and 
Pierce’s defamation claim did not affect the nature of Vickie’s 
claim as being a tort claim at common law that attempts to bring 
property into the bankruptcy estate.
68
  
The Court distinguished Katchen v. Landy on the basis that, in 
that case, the Court allowed a bankruptcy court to summarily 
adjudicate a debtor’s preference claims against a creditor of the 
estate where “it was not possible for the referee to rule on the 
creditor’s proof of claim without first resolving the voidable 
preference issue.”69 Put another way, “the same issue [arose] as 
part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims.”70 
The Court limited its prior language in Katchen that “he who 
invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of 
claim and demanding its allowance must abide the consequences 
of that procedure” to circumstances in which the claim of the 
debtor must be resolved in order to determine the allowability of 
the creditor’s claim.71  
The Court distinguished Langenkamp on the basis that, there, a 
preference action was allowed to be heard where the allegedly 
preferred creditor had filed a claim because “then ‘the ensuing 
preference action by the trustee become[s] integral to the 
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.’”72 Because the 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 2616 (citing to Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); 
Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990)).  
 68. Id.   
 69. Id. (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 329–30, 332–33, n.9, 334). The statute 
at issue in Katchen was Bankruptcy Act, § 57(g)g, the predecessor to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(d), which requires that amounts owed on account of avoidance actions be 
paid to the estate before claims of entities from which property is recoverable 
through avoidance will be allowed.  
 70. Id. (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336).   
 71. Id. (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 333, n.9).  
 72. Id. at 2617 (citing Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44).  
662 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
bankruptcy court in Vickie’s case “was required to and did make 
several factual and legal determinations that were not ‘disposed of 
in passing on objections’ to Pierce’s proof of claim for 
defamation,” such resolution was not integral as in Langenkamp.73 
“There was never any reason to believe that the process of 
adjudicating Pierce’s proof of claim would necessarily resolve 
Vickie’s counterclaim.”74 As pointed out by the United States as 
amicus curiae, the issue presented is whether the bankruptcy court 
has authority to enter a final order on a compulsory counterclaim
75
 
where adjudication of that counterclaim requires resolution of 
issues that are not all implicated by the creditor’s claim against the 
estate.
76
 The Court held that a bankruptcy court has no such 
authority.
77
    
The Court also distinguished Katchen and Langenkamp on the 
basis that the actions brought by the trustees in those cases arose 
under federal bankruptcy law, not state common law, like Vickie’s 
counterclaim.
78
  
3. Bankruptcy Courts Are Not Adjuncts of Article III Courts 
The Court next considered Vickie’s argument that bankruptcy 
courts are mere “adjuncts” of Article III Courts.79 The Court 
concluded that “a court exercising such broad powers is no mere 
adjunct of anyone.”80 The Court explained that after the 1984 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he new bankruptcy 
courts, like the old, do not ‘ma[k]e only specialized, narrowly 
confined factual determinations regarding a particularized area of 
law’ or engage in ‘statutorily channeled factfinding functions.’”81 
Indeed, a bankruptcy court resolving a counterclaim pursuant to 
§ 157(b)(2)(C) has the power to enter final judgment subject to 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. The majority noted that “[t]here was some overlap between Vickie’s 
counterclaim and Pierce’s defamation claim that led the courts below to 
conclude that the counterclaim was compulsory or at least in an ‘attenuated’ 
sense related to Pierce’s claim.” Id. (citations omitted). The dissent also notes 
that the counterclaim was compulsory because it “arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” Id. at 2626 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 13(A); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7013).  
 76. Id. at 2617. 
 77. Id. at 2617–18.  
 78. Id. at 2618. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 2611.  
 81. Id. at 2618 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)) (alteration in original).  
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review only if a party chooses to appeal.
82
 Thus, as in Marathon, 
the Court found that this authority is Article III authority being 
exercised by a non-Article III court.
83
 “[A] bankruptcy court can 
no more be deemed a mere ‘adjunct’ of the district court than a 
district court can be deemed an ‘adjunct’ of the court of appeals.”84 
That current bankruptcy judges are appointed by courts of appeals 
rather than the President (which was a post-Marathon 
Congressional change intended to aid in bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction) is irrelevant.
85
  
4. That the Majority Opinion Restricts a Bankruptcy Court’s 
Ability to Enter Final Judgments on Certain State Law 
Counterclaims may be Administratively Burdensome does not 
Change the Result 
The Court made short shrift of the fact that bankruptcy courts 
not having core adjudicatory authority over such counterclaims 
would be administratively burdensome. The Court explained that 
“the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and 
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will 
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”86 Moreover, not all 
issues are currently consolidated before the bankruptcy courts—
certain other state law matters may already be heard by state 
courts.
87
 Further, the district courts already have de novo review of 
“related to” matters pursuant to § 157(c)(1), and the district courts 
are permitted to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court 
on the motion of a party or on its own.
88
 The Court did not believe 
its holding would prevent bankruptcy courts from hearing state law 
counterclaims; rather, it would prevent bankruptcy courts only 
from entering final orders on such counterclaims.
89
   
B. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
Justice Scalia found “something . . . seriously amiss” with the 
jurisprudence in this area in light of the numerous, varied, and 
seemingly “random[]” reasons given by the majority for finding 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. at 2619. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).  
 87. Id. at 2619–20 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) & (2)).  
 88. Id. at 2620.  
 89. Id.  
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§ 157(b)(2)(C) unconstitutional under Article III.
90
 Scalia 
explained that, in his view, an Article III judge is required in “all 
federal adjudications” unless there is some “firmly established 
historical practice to the contrary,” though that subject was not 
briefed by the parties.
91
        
C. Dissent (Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan) 
The dissent agreed with the majority that § 157(b)(2)(C) 
authorizes a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a compulsory 
counterclaim to a proof of claim filed in a bankruptcy case but did 
not agree with the majority that the statute is unconstitutional. 
Instead, the minority explained that “the statute is consistent with 
the Constitution’s delegation of the ‘judicial Power of the United 
States’ to the Judicial Branch of Government,” and, consequently, 
the statute is constitutional.
92
 In other words, this delegation of 
authority to a non-Article III tribunal—the bankruptcy courts—is 
no affront to Article III.  
The dissent maintained that the majority emphasized the wrong 
precedent. The dissent believed the majority’s focus on Murray’s 
Lessee, as a source of the limits of Article III Judicial Power, relied 
on dicta. Instead, the dissent thought the focus should be on the 
public/private right distinction and noted that some public rights 
are outside the cognizance of the Article III courts.
93
  
The dissent also believed the majority underemphasized the 
importance of Crowell v. Benson, in which the Court allowed a 
grant of administrative adjudicative power to an agency regarding 
questions of law and fact, with legal conclusions to be reviewed de 
novo and fact-finding reviewed under a “supported by evidence in 
the record” standard of review.94 Under that precedent, such a 
delegation did not violate Article III, and a similar delegation to 
bankruptcy courts also should not violate Article III. The 
majority’s narrow reading of Crowell, which limited it to the 
allowance of specialized tribunals for factual determinations in 
particularized areas of law, would be an affront to other 
Congressional delegations of authority, e.g., to the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 91. Id. at 2620–21.  
 92. Id. at 2622 (dissenting opinion).  
 93. Id. at 2623.  
 94. Id.  
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Surface Transportation Board, and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development.
95
  
Rather than leaning on Marathon, the dissent would look 
instead to Thomas and Schor, “with an eye to the practical effect 
that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally 
assigned role of the federal judiciary.”96 Accordingly, the dissent 
would examine five factors in determining whether a non-Article 
III tribunal has adjudicatory authority without running afoul of 
Article III: (1) the origins and importance of the right to be 
adjudicated; (2) the extent to which the non-Article III forum 
exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested 
only in Article III courts; (3) the extent to which the delegation 
nonetheless reserves judicial power for exercise by Article III 
courts; (4) the presence or absence of the parties’ consent to initial 
adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal; and (5) the concerns 
that drove Congress to depart from adjudication in an Article III 
court.
97
 The dissent explained that the first factor weighed against 
bankruptcy court adjudication because the claim is a tort claim, but 
the fact that it is in a compulsory counterclaim undercuts the 
negative aspect of that factor.
98
 The remaining factors weighed in 
favor of bankruptcy court adjudication: (2) the tribunal has similar 
protections as Article III judges that safeguard their protection 
from improper political influence; (3) the district courts control 
and supervise bankruptcy determinations (with respect to core 
matters, findings of fact reviewed for clear error, conclusions of 
law, de novo), and district courts can withdraw the bankruptcy 
reference; (4) the parties consented to the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction (and Pierce could have brought his claim in state or 
federal court since he argued it was nondischargeable); and (5) the 
bankruptcy courts serve important legislative purposes—to “create 
an efficient, effective federal bankruptcy system,” to deal with 
“restructuring of debtor-creditor relations,” to interpret and apply 
the uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies as set forth in 
Article I § 8 of the Constitution, and to resolve claims (and 
counterclaims) in bankruptcy cases in a consolidated forum.
99
 
Therefore, “any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be 
termed de minimis.”100  
                                                                                                             
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 2625. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 2626.  
 99. Id. at 2626–29.  
 100. Id. at 2629.  
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Finally, the dissent noted the staggering frequency with which 
compulsory counterclaims based on state law claims arise in 
bankruptcy and lamented the now “constitutionally required game 
of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts,” which will “lead to 
inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless additional 
suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”101  
III. ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS  
A. Are We Facing Marathon Problems Again? 
That the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional part of the 
statutory scheme relating to bankruptcy courts’ exercise of 
adjudicatory authority in the realm of district courts’ bankruptcy 
jurisdiction, which was enacted for the purpose of remedying 
Marathon issues with respect to bankruptcy courts, may provide a 
basis for future litigation challenging the jurisdictional foundation 
of bankruptcy courts generally. Even though the majority 
represented that it did not “think the removal of counterclaims such 
as Vickie’s from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully 
changes the division of labor in the current statute,”102 
frighteningly, the majority also explained that: “With respect to 
such ‘core’ matters, however, the bankruptcy courts under the 
1984 Act exercise the same powers they wielded under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978.”103 Might this analysis be used to argue 
that the exercise of adjudicatory authority over “core” proceedings 
by bankruptcy courts—some or all exercises of it—is an 
unconstitutional encroachment into Article III Judicial Power, as it 
was in Marathon? The Court proceeded to shake the foundation of 
bankruptcy court authority further by stating: “Nor can the 
bankruptcy courts under the 1984 Act be dismissed as mere 
adjuncts of Article III courts, any more than could the bankruptcy 
courts under the 1978 Act.”104 If bankruptcy courts are not 
“adjuncts” under Article III notwithstanding their being designated 
as “units” of the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 151,105 then on what 
authority do they operate?   
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 2630.  
 102. Id. at 2620.  
 103. Id. at 2610.  
 104. Id. at 2611.  
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 151 provides:  
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service 
shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the 
bankruptcy court for that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial 
officer of the district court, may exercise the authority conferred under 
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Bankruptcy courts must be authorized constitutionally—either 
under Article I § 8, as a legislative tribunal, or under Article III, as 
a court exercising judicial power, or possibly as an adjunct thereof.  
But, the plurality in Marathon determined the bankruptcy courts 
were not Article I courts because they did not fit within the defined 
categories (territorial courts, courts martial, or “public rights” 
courts) and expressly noted that Congress established the 
bankruptcy courts as “adjuncts” and not as legislative courts.106 
The Marathon plurality did note, however, that  
[the] restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at 
the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be 
distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private 
rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is 
at issue in this case. The former may well be a ‘public 
right,’ but the latter is not.107  
But, in Stern, the Court backed off of that statement in footnote 7 
of the majority opinion. Because neither party before the Court 
asked it to consider whether “the restructuring of debtor-creditor 
relations is in fact a public right,” the Court did not decide that 
issue.
108
 However, the Court did, with eerie implications, state that 
it was taking the same view expressed in Granfinanciera: that “we 
did not mean to ‘suggest that the restructuring of debtor-creditor 
relations is in fact a public right.’”109 In sum, if bankruptcy courts 
are not Article I courts per Marathon and the intentionally 
unanswered question in Stern (because they are not territorial 
courts or courts martial, and because the Court refused to even 
suggest that bankruptcy courts are courts resolving “public 
rights”)110 then, to have some constitutional foundation, they must 
fall within Article III; however, we know bankruptcy judges are 
not blessed with the constitutionally-required lifetime tenure, non-
reducible salary, and Presidential appointment with Senate 
confirmation that Article III judges have, so they cannot be Article 
                                                                                                             
 
this chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and may 
preside alone and hold a regular or special session of the court, except 
as otherwise provided by law or by rule or order of the district court.  
28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 106. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63 
n.13 (1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).  
 107. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added). 
 108. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614, n.7 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 
492 U.S. 33, 56, n.11 (1989)). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71. 
668 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
III Courts, and we know further from Stern that bankruptcy courts 
are “no mere adjunct of anyone.”111 As the Stern Court explained: 
“[S]uch judges should not be in the business of entering final 
judgments in the first place” if they are “deemed a mere ‘adjunct’ 
of the district court.”112  
Accordingly, it is unclear, at best, what the constitutional 
authority for bankruptcy courts actually is, and Stern was careful 
not to answer that question.
113
 Although the Court expressly 
limited its holding to bankruptcy courts’ adjudicatory authority 
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) over state law counterclaims not 
otherwise resolved in the claims resolution process, the Court’s 
reasoning arguably undermines the soundness of the bankruptcy 
court adjudicatory scheme as a whole.  
Courts have, to date, been divided on how far Stern reaches.  
On one end of the spectrum, a bankruptcy court has ruled it cannot 
even hear, much less enter a final order on, fraudulent conveyance 
actions because they are “quintessentially suits at common law” 
and because there is no statutory mechanism for entering a report 
and recommendation on an unconstitutional core proceeding.
114
 At 
the other end, courts have ruled that Stern is to be construed 
narrowly and that bankruptcy courts have core adjudicatory 
authority over various kinds of actions under the “public rights” 
exception,
115
 notwithstanding Stern’s admonition that “We noted 
[in Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the 
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public 
right.’”116  
                                                                                                             
 111. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.  
 112. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619.  
 113. The most constitutionally sound answer to this question this author can 
muster is that bankruptcy courts must be Article I courts, authorized to 
adjudicate bankruptcy cases based upon a modern formulation of the “public 
rights” doctrine (in that bankruptcy cases are “integrally related to particular 
Federal Government action,” Id. at 2598 (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011))), with necessary reference to the Bankruptcy 
Code, as the embodiment of the legislative bankruptcy power in Article I § 8, as 
described above. But, this conclusion contradicts precedent and applicable 
legislative statements. Thus, one is left to wonder what the constitutional basis 
currently underlying bankruptcy court authority actually is.     
 114. See, e.g., Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 
3274042 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011).    
 115. See, e.g., In re Okwonna-Felix, No. 10-31663, 2011 WL 3421561 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2011); Sanders v. Muhs (In re Muhs), No. 09-10564, 
2011 WL 3421546 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011); Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. 
Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); In re Bigler, L.P., 458 
B.R. 345 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).  
 116. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 n.7 (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56). 
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B. Cases Applying Stern
117
 
1. On Counterclaims 
In Turner v. First Community Credit Union (In re Turner), the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas considered 
whether it had jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding initiated 
by a debtor against its bank regarding the freezing of its bank 
account and denial of access to funds.
118
 The court determined that 
the adversary proceeding was a core proceeding under the general 
catchall: “a proceeding is core under section 157 if it invokes a 
substantive right provided by title 11 or if it is a proceeding that, 
by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy 
case.”119 The court raised the issue of whether Stern affected its 
adjudicatory authority. The court explained that:  
Because the Debtors’ suit against First Community is in 
effect a counterclaim against this institution which filed 
proofs of claim in the Debtors’ main case, at first blush it 
would appear that Stern is on all fours and therefore that: 
(1) this Court does not have the constitutional authority to 
enter a final judgment in this dispute; and (2) this Court 
must therefore submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the District Court, together with a 
proposed judgment to be signed by that Article III Court.
120
  
But the court distinguished Stern because (1) while state law issues 
were at the heart of the counterclaim in Stern, in this case, the 
alleged stay violations were based upon Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) 
and (2) the Debtors’ requested relief was based upon an express 
Bankruptcy Code provision: § 362(k).
121
 Alternatively, the court 
determined that the stay violation dispute fell within the “public 
rights” exception to Article III adjudicatory authority, noting that 
“what makes a right ‘public’ rather than private is that the right is 
integrally related to particular federal government action.”122 The 
                                                                                                             
 117. Please reference the accompanying case chart, attached as Appendix B, 
which divides the cases discussed herein by subject matter and then by circuit, 
and which also notes whether the holdings represent expansive or narrow 
readings of Stern. 
 118. Turner v. First Cmty. Credit Union (In re Turner), 2011 WL 2708907, 
at *1, *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 11, 2011).  
 119. Id. at *3 (quoting In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 930 (5th Cir. 
1999)). 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at *4.  
 122. Id.  
670 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
court concluded that it may exercise authority over essential 
bankruptcy matters under the “public rights” exception under the 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co. statement of 
that exception, which maintains that “a right closely integrated into 
a public regulatory scheme . . . may be resolved by a non-Article 
III tribunal.”123  
The Bankruptcy Code is a public scheme for restructuring 
debtor-creditor relations, necessarily including “the 
exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s 
property, the equitable distribution of that property among 
the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that gives 
the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from 
further liability for old debts.”124  
Thus, the court ruled that it could enter a final judgment in this 
matter.
125
 
In Jones v. Mandel (In re Mandel), the Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas considered issues relating to a breach 
of contract proof of claim and corresponding adversary proceeding 
relating to non-payment under a building contract.
126
 The court 
determined, with respect to a counterclaim for restitution (based 
upon improper use of exclusive, copyrighted plans for the subject 
property being used on another property) asserted in the adversary 
proceeding, that “[i]n light of the recent opinion by the Supreme 
Court in Stern v. Marshall, the court does not have the 
constitutional authority to decide this counterclaim—at least not in 
the absence of the parties’ express consent.”127  
In In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, a Northern District of 
Illinois bankruptcy court determined it had the authority to enter a 
final order on counterclaims asserted by the debtor either (1) where 
the parties consented or (2) where the counterclaims were resolved 
in the process of adjudicating claims.
128
 In reaching its conclusion, 
the court explained that Stern held a bankruptcy court “lacks the 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 
593 (1985)).  
 124. Id. (citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006); 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982)). But 
see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n. 7 (2011) (“We noted [in 
Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”).  
 125. Id. at *5.  
 126. Jones v. Mandel (In re Mandel), 2011 WL 2728415, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tex. July 12, 2011). 
 127. Id.  
 128. In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 2011 WL 3792406, at *1 (Bankr. 
N. D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011).  
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constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law 
counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a 
creditor’s proof of claim”129 and noted that the Supreme Court 
specified that its holding is a “narrow” one and “does not change 
all that much.”130 The court also explained that, under Stern, a 
counterclaim that falls within the public rights exception, and thus 
does not require the parties’ consent for final adjudication by the 
bankruptcy court, is one that stems from the bankruptcy or would 
be necessarily resolved in the claims allowance process.
131
 Two of 
the debtor’s counterclaims were “defensive” in nature and “had to 
be resolved in order to rule on” proofs of claim that were filed.132 
Three of the debtor’s counterclaims were not so resolvable because 
they “each required legal and factual determinations different from 
[the creditor’s] contract claim,” and, after Stern, though they are 
“core” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), they must be treated as 
non-core because final adjudication by a bankruptcy court over 
them would be unconstitutional.
133
 However, because the parties 
gave consent to the entry of final orders by the bankruptcy judge as 
to all five counterclaims, the court retained that authority under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).
134
 The court concluded:  
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern in no way altered the 
system of final adjudication by consent embodied in 
§ 157(c)(2). . . . The issue at hand, therefore, is not whether 
the parties here could consent to a Bankruptcy Judge’s 
jurisdiction, but whether they could consent to a 
Bankruptcy Judge’s power to enter final judgment.135  
In Siegel v. FDIC (In re Indymac Bankcorp. Inc.),
136
 the 
District Court for the Central District of California refused to 
withdraw the reference regarding a bankruptcy court’s adjudication 
of non-core counterclaim dispute over ownership of $50 million in 
tax refunds. The court acknowledged that the issue was non-core 
and noted the similarities to Stern due to the counterclaim’s 
posture and the fact that the counterclaim is a private right of 
action, not public.
137
 However, the court refused to withdraw the 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. at *3. 
 130. Id. at *5. 
 131. Id. at *4.  
 132. Id. at *5. 
 133. Id. at *6.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at *7–8.  
 136. Siegel v. FDIC (In re Indymac Bankcorp. Inc.), 2011 WL 2883012, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011). 
 137. Id. at *6.  
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reference because (1) the bankruptcy court had greater familiarity 
with the facts, (2) the bankruptcy court held a unique vantage point 
from the center of the overall bankruptcy proceeding, (3) 
withdrawal would likely increase costs and lead to duplicative 
efforts, and (4) withdrawal would invite new disputes, such as for 
transfer of venue.
138
 Thus, the court determined it would be best to 
decline to withdraw the reference and that it would instead review 
the report and recommendation de novo.
139
  
2. On State Law Issues 
A Maine district court in United Systems Access Telecom, Inc. 
v. Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC, refused to 
rule on Stern grounds with respect to the question of whether the 
bankruptcy reference should be withdrawn by the district court 
with respect to a dispute based largely upon FCC regulation under 
§ 157(d), which requires withdrawal of the reference where 
“consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States 
regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate 
commerce” are involved.140 The court determined that 
telecommunications are subject to extensive FCC regulation under 
federal statute, and even though certain state public utilities 
commissions are delegated some authority, the dispute is “all 
within the context of overall federal regulation.”141 As such, the 
plaintiff’s alternative arguments that “state law rather than federal 
law governs these disputes;[ therefore] . . . the Constitution 
demands that the disputes be tried in this Article III court” and the 
defendant’s arguments that “no interpretation of federal 
telecommunication law is required to resolve the disputes, and that 
under Stern, the public rights exception allows the state law issues 
to be adjudicated in the Bankruptcy Court” did not form the basis 
of the court’s opinion.142 The judge explained that he “need not 
reach the issue whether Stern would alternatively require 
withdrawal of the reference, and I [did] not decide the contours of 
the public rights exception.”143 
In NYU Hospitals Center v. HRH Construction LLC (In re 
HRH Construction LLC), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York adjudicated on a final basis a state breach of 
                                                                                                             
 138. Id. at *7.  
 139. Id.  
 140. 456 B.R. 148 (D. Me. 2011).  
 141. Id. at 149.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
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contract action, which had been removed to the district court and 
then referred to the bankruptcy court, because “[p]ursuant to letters 
filed on the docket in July of 2011, the parties consented to the 
entry of th[e] decision [by the bankruptcy court] as a final 
judgment.”144    
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
in In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries denied a motion by an art-
consignor-creditor (with a $9.5 million claim relating to a 
Botticelli painting) seeking a lift of the stay to enforce a 
contractual choice of law provision against a liquidation trustee of 
an art gallery’s bankruptcy estate with respect to whether the 
Botticelli painting was property of the debtor prior to the 
bankruptcy under New Jersey law.
145
  The court reasoned that the 
determination was an “essential and inseparable element of an 
action under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)” and was “inextricably 
bound up with the resolution of the art claim and proof of claim it 
filed” in the case.146  The court emphasized that  
Stern is replete with language emphasizing that the ruling 
should be limited to the unique circumstances of that case, 
and the ruling does not remove from the bankruptcy court 
its jurisdiction over matters directly related to the estate 
that can be finally decided in connection with restructuring 
debtor and creditor relations.
147
  
Further, “[n]owhere in Marathon, Granfinanciera, or Stern does 
the Supreme Court rule that the bankruptcy court may not rule with 
respect to state law when determining a proof of claim in the 
bankruptcy, or when deciding a matter directly and conclusively 
related to the bankruptcy.”148 If the court were to grant the lift-stay 
request, then the creditor’s claim would be adjudicated by someone 
other than the bankruptcy court, which “may not be done—
allowance of claims is indisputably the realm of the bankruptcy 
court.”149 Thus, the court determined that “[a]rbitration of whether 
the Botticelli was property of the debtor or property of the estate 
would improperly sever an element of the § 544 action” and that 
other creditors are not bound by the choice of law clause, including 
the bank (with a lien on the Botticelli) and the trustee (as assignee 
                                                                                                             
 144. No. 09–23665(RDD), 2011 WL 3359576, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 
2011).  
 145. 453 B.R. 106 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 146. Id. at 115.  
 147. Id. at 115–16.  
 148. Id. at 117. 
 149. Id. at 118 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1)).  
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of that lien).
150
 Simply because state law may apply to the issue 
does not remove it from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
151
 
“Bankruptcy courts may apply state law as part of the resolution of 
core proceedings.”152 The court also determined that it was not 
required to send the matter to arbitration under the contractual 
clause for myriad reasons.
153
  
In Buffets Holdings, Inc. v. California Franchise Tax Board,
154
 
the Delaware Bankruptcy Court considered summary judgment 
motions presenting issues regarding the apportionment of debtors’ 
income that is taxable under California law and whether the 
debtors qualified for a “Manufacturers’ Investment Credit,” also 
under California law.
155
 The court explained that it “ha[d] core 
jurisdiction over the motions for summary judgment, which 
essentially involve[d] the allowance of the [Tax Board]’s 
claims.”156 The court cited Stern for the proposition that “the 
question [of bankruptcy court jurisdiction] is whether the action at 
issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be 
resolved in the claims allowance process” and cited the Stern 
dissent for the proposition that “when the individual files a claim 
against the estate, that individual has ‘triggered the process of 
allowance and disallowance of claims, thereby subjecting himself 
to the bankruptcy court’s equitable power.’”157 
In In re The Salem Baptist Church of Jenkintown, a 
Pennsylvania bankruptcy court explained in a footnote that 
[a]lthough the precise implications of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Stern on the related-to jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy courts remain to be determined, the Supreme 
Court’s holding that bankruptcy courts may not decide “a 
common law cause of action, when the action neither 
derives from nor depends on any agency regulatory 
regime” . . . suggests that, consistent with this Court’s 
decision herein, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear 
the Debtor’s claims against [the defendants].158 
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. at 120.  
 151. Id. (citing Stern and Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48 (1979)).  
 152. Id. at 123.  
 153. Id. at 127–29.  
 154. 455 B.R. 94 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
 155. Id. at 96.  
 156. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1)(B) & 1334). 
 157. Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618, 2629 (2011) 
(internal citations omitted)).  
 158. 455 B.R. 857, 863 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011). 
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In this case, the court granted motions to dismiss actions relating to 
insurance coverage of certain claims and the issue of whether 
insurance proceeds were property of the estate. Thus, the court 
believed that Stern extends to “common law causes of action” 
whether or not in a counterclaim posture and that Stern’s ruling 
was jurisdictional.  
In Barnhart v. Demarco (In re Demarco), a Pennsylvania 
bankruptcy court held that an adversary proceeding, in which state 
and federal law claims against the debtor and certain non-debtors 
were asserted, could have no possible effect on the debtor’s estate 
and, thus, that the court lacked related-to jurisdiction over the 
adversary proceeding where the chapter 7 trustee in the debtor’s 
case entered a report of no distribution stating that there was no 
properly available over and above exempted property and 
requesting discharge of the debtor.
159
 The court also noted that, “to 
the extent that a plaintiff has joined its § 523 action with claims 
against third-party, nondebtor entities, it is doubtful that a 
bankruptcy court would, in a no-asset, chapter 7 case, retain 
jurisdiction over the claims against nondebtor entities.”160 The 
court bolstered that conclusion by noting that:  
Although the precise implications of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Stern on the related-to jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy courts remain to be determined, the Supreme 
Court’s holding that bankruptcy courts may not decide “a 
common law cause of action, when the action neither 
derives from nor depends on any agency regulatory 
regime” suggests that, consistent with this Court’s decision 
herein, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear the 
Plaintiff’s claims against nondebtor entities.161  
In Fed. Ins. Co. v. DBSI, Inc. (In re DBSI, Inc.), the Delaware 
Bankruptcy Court considered a motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of whether the debtor’s director and officer (D&O) 
insurance policy covers the defense costs of certain D&Os sued 
based upon certain actions (including RICO and avoidance actions) 
where the actions were filed after the D&O policy coverage 
period.
162
 The court determined that the movants were entitled to 
the coverage of defense costs at 100% where the claim at issue 
                                                                                                             
 159. 454 B.R. 343, 344, 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).  
 160. Id. at 348.  
 161. Id. at n.2 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2599).  
 162. No. 08–12687(PJW), 2011 WL 3022177, at *1–2 (Bankr. D. Del. July 
22, 2011).  
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involved a covered matter and a non-covered matter.
163
 However, 
the court refused to “enter[] an order at this time because [it was] 
concerned that this Court’s jurisdiction may be in question in light 
of the Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall. Before 
proceeding further with this matter, [the court invited] the parties 
to file written submissions on whether Stern v. Marshall permit[ted 
the judge] to issue an order.”164  
A West Virginia district court in Cline v. Quicken Loans
165
 
determined that it had “related-to” jurisdiction over a civil action 
asserting myriad state law causes of action, which was removed to 
that court from the West Virginia state court, even though a related 
proof of claim was also filed, and explained that “the proof of 
claim does not transform the State Court Action filed by Plaintiffs 
into a core proceeding.”166 The court noted that the plaintiffs had 
filed a supplemental briefing on Stern with the court on the issue of 
core adjudicatory authority, but did not further discuss Stern. The 
court determined that mandatory abstention applied and that 
comity and judicial economy did not weigh in favor of retaining 
the action in federal, as opposed to state, court.
167
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sigillito v. Hollander (In 
re Hollander)
168
 remanded a case for the bankruptcy court to 
decide whether, under Louisiana law, the debtor’s false 
representations constituted fraud and further explained that it 
would “leave it to the district court below to determine in the first 
instance whether Stern has applicability to further proceedings in 
this matter.”169  
Before deciding a motion for partial summary judgment filed 
by a secured creditor as to the validity of its lien, the Louisiana 
Bankruptcy Court in South Louisiana Ethanol, LLC v. Whitney 
National Bank (In re South. Louisiana Ethanol, LLC) provided the 
following caveat: “To the extent this Court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Stern v. Marshall, 
this Opinion will be considered a Report and Recommendation to 
the U.S. District Court.” 170  
In Rogers v. The CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. (In re 
B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc.),
171
 a Mississippi bankruptcy court 
                                                                                                             
 163. Id. at *5.  
 164. Id. at *6.  
 165. No. 5:11CV63, 2011 WL 2633085 (N.D.W. Va. July 5, 2011). 
 166. Id. at *5. 
 167. Id. at *7.  
 168. 2011 WL 3629479 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011). 
 169. Id. at *4 n.1.  
 170. 438 Fed.Appx. 274, n. 1 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2011).  
 171. 455 B.R. 524 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011). 
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determined it could enter a final order on various Mississippi state 
law contract and tort claims of a debtor in an adversary proceeding. 
The court explained that the proceeding was core, notwithstanding 
Stern, because “[t]he implications of the Stern decision, including 
the extent to which it curtails bankruptcy court jurisdiction, remain 
to be determined by the Fifth Circuit,” and the court’s ruling was 
in accord with prior Fifth Circuit precedent.
172
 
In Christian v. Soo Bin Kim (In re Soo Bin Kim), a Western 
District of Texas bankruptcy court denied a motion seeking 
dismissal of a complaint requesting a declaration of non-
dischargeability of a debt, liquidation of that debt, and a monetary 
judgment against the debtor, which argued that the judgment 
sought fell within the “probate exception” to bankruptcy courts’ 
subject matter jurisdiction.
173
 The court responded to a defendant’s 
argument that, under Stern, the bankruptcy court “cannot hear any 
of this matter because it touches on probate issues” by explaining 
that “the defendant overreads that case and its application to this 
proceeding” and instead followed binding Fifth Circuit precedent 
on the probate issue implicated.
174
 The court refused to dismiss the 
complaint notwithstanding the fact that “[i]n resolving the 
bankruptcy question posed, the court may necessarily be called 
upon to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that might 
have some preclusive effect in a later state court action.”175 
However, the court determined it would abstain from “liquidation” 
of the claim or involving “disposition of assets of the probate 
estate” in favor of the probate court.176  
In In re Crescent Resources, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Texas determined that Stern did not apply to 
the matter before it: a motion to compel turnover of documents, the 
determination of which depended upon whether certain documents 
were subject to a joint privilege, who can claim such privilege, and 
whether the files could be used against certain parties.
177
 The court 
determined that the matter was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), and (H) and expressed that it “[wa]s of the 
opinion, at th[at] point, that Stern . . . should be applied narrowly. 
The facts and issues in Stern do not relate to matters under 
consideration of the Court. The Court therefore [found] that Stern 
does not apply to this case.”178  
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. at 548, n.31.  
 173. 2011 WL 2708985, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 11, 2011).  
 174. Id. at *2 n.2.  
 175. Id. at *2.  
 176. Id.  
 177. 457 B.R. 506, 509 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).   
 178. Id. at 510, n.2.  
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The Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 
District of Texas denied a motion to dismiss a title dispute 
adversary proceeding in In re Crusader Energy Group.
179
 The 
plaintiff filed the adversary proceeding seeking a determination 
that certain mineral interests that had been scheduled as property of 
the estate by the debtors were instead property of the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff sought a broad application of Stern. The defendant argued 
that Stern was a narrow ruling that applied to only certain types of 
counterclaims and certainly not to a title dispute in which the 
defendant was not asserting a counterclaim. In denying the motion 
to dismiss, Judge Houser opined from the bench that determining 
what is property of the estate is central to the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court via referral from the district court.
180
 Judge 
Houser also ruled that, in the event her ruling on jurisdiction was 
incorrect, she would request that the district court review her prior 
rulings in the adversary proceeding on summary judgment motions 
and accept them as a report and recommendation to the district 
court.
181
 The plaintiff argued that, in a core proceeding for which 
there is no constitutional authority for the bankruptcy court to enter 
a final judgment, the bankruptcy court can, in fact, do nothing, not 
even submit a report and recommendation on the matter to the 
district court (citing to Blixseth, discussed in more detail herein).
182
 
The defendant argued that, while a submission of a report and 
recommendation to the district court is mandatory in non-core 
matters, there is nothing that prohibits the bankruptcy court from 
doing so in other matters; thus, the bankruptcy court may submit a 
report and recommendation to the district court in a core matter 
even if the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority 
to enter a final judgment.
183
 Judge Houser agreed with the 
defendant and explained that the plaintiff’s position would render 
an absurd result, leaving the bankruptcy court with no options, and 
federal judges are not supposed to construe statutes in a manner 
that yields absurd results.
184
  
In In re Miller, an Ohio bankruptcy court determined that it 
would be acting “within the court’s constitutional authority as 
analyzed by” Stern by entering a final order over determinations of 
whether certain property was property of the estate, or 
                                                                                                             
 179. Earthwise Energy, Inc., et al. v. Crusader Energy Group, Inc. (In re 
Crusader Energy Group), Case No. 09-31797-bjh-11; Adv. Proc. No. 09-03141-
bjh (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2011 [Docket No. 134]).   
 180. Id. at Docket No. 133.    
 181. Id.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id.  
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alternatively, whether such property was exempted under state 
law.
185
  
In Tibble v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Hudson), the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Western District of Michigan decided whether Wells 
Fargo’s lien in real property was valid where the mortgage 
contained an incorrect description of the real property—it 
referenced the wrong lot number.
186
 The court determined that it 
had jurisdiction, by reference from the district court, under 28 
U.S.C. § 1334, and that the proceeding was core.
187
 After 
determining that any mortgage asserted by Wells Fargo was 
avoidable by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) and that the 
trustee could administer the real property free and clear of any lien 
asserted by the bank, the court addressed Stern.
188
 The court 
explained the ruling in Stern but distinguished the case before it on 
the basis that:  
This adversary proceeding, even though it requires 
reviewing, discussing and deciding state law issues, pertains 
to the determination of the validity, extent, or priority of the 
Bank’s asserted mortgage lien in Lot 5. Regardless of the 
state law issues, this adversary proceeding “arises under” 
§ 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.
189
  
The court ended with a cautionary note: In the event the court’s 
order were to be appealed, and if the district court were to decide 
that the bankruptcy court was not constitutionally authorized to 
enter a final order, the bankruptcy court’s opinion is to be deemed 
a report and recommendation.
190
 
In Mason v. Szerwinski (In re Szerwinski), an Ohio bankruptcy 
court determined its “decision [was] within the court’s 
constitutional authority under the Supreme Court’s analysis in” 
Stern where it dealt with the issues of avoidability of a lien based 
upon applicable Ohio property law.
191
 
In Keybank National Association v. Martinez (In re Martinez), 
an Ohio bankruptcy court determined that Stern did not limit its 
core authority over a state law conversion claim and issues relating 
to dischargeability.
192
 The court simply stated that its “decision is 
                                                                                                             
 185. 2011 WL 3741846, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2011). 
 186. 455 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).   
 187. Id. at 650.  
 188. Id. at 656.  
 189. Id. at 657 (citing In re Salander Galleries, 453 B.R. 106 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
 190. Id.  
 191. 2011 WL 2551012, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 27, 2011). 
 192. 2011 WL 2925481, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 18, 2011). 
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within the court’s constitutional authority as analyzed by” Stern, 
and in any event, “the parties have consented to the entry of a final 
order by this court.”193 
In Dragisic v. Boricich (In re Boricich),
194
 an Illinois 
bankruptcy court considered an adversary proceeding commenced 
against a debtor, which asserted the non-dischargeability of a $1.5 
million claim on various grounds supporting exception to 
discharge relating to larceny, fraud while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity, defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, and 
embezzlement. Even though applicable Seventh Circuit precedent 
pre-Stern had allowed bankruptcy courts to enter a final money 
judgment on a state law claim in a non-dischargeability action, in 
light of Stern, the court refused to enter judgment as to the amount 
of non-dischargeable debt.
195
 Instead, the court reserved 
jurisdiction to entertain a motion to amend the judgment supported 
by briefs submitted by the parties discussing whether Stern leaves 
such constitutional authority to a bankruptcy judge in this 
scenario.
196
 The court determined that $659,160.85 was not 
dischargeable and owed to Dragisic.
197
 
In Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.),
198
 an Illinois 
bankruptcy court ruled that res judicata did not apply with respect to 
certain counterclaims that were intentionally severed because the 
claims were previously asserted to be “different.”199 Prior to 
reaching that conclusion, the court determined that, under Stern, the 
trustee’s claims against the defendants were counterclaims and thus 
would likely need to be decided by an Article III judge. However,  
even if the trustee’s bankruptcy complaint were wholly 
within the scope of the Stern decision, and so removed 
from core jurisdiction, it would still affect the extent of the 
estate available to pay Emerald’s creditors. Therefore, the 
trustee’s complaint would at least be within the “related-to” 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and, as set forth in 28 
U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), a bankruptcy judge may propose 
findings and conclusions to the district court for that court’s 
entry of judgment pursuant to such jurisdiction.
200
 
                                                                                                             
 193. Id.  
 194. 2011 WL 2600692, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 29, 2011).  
 195. Id. at *9. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at *11.  
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The court also dispensed with the defendant’s argument, based 
on Blixseth (discussed herein), that the court could not even hear 
the unconstitutional core matter because no provision of § 157 
provides for that where such a proceeding is not non-core. The 
court explained that: 
The argument . . . ignores the remedy flowing from Stern’s 
holding that the statute unconstitutionally allows judgments 
to be entered by a non-Article III court. . . . [T]he remedy 
for this constitutional violation [in Stern] is to remove 
counterclaims covered by the decision from core 
jurisdiction. . . . As a result, to the extent that the estate’s 
claims are not subject to a final judgment by the bankruptcy 
court, they are non-core, and fully within the definition of 
related-to jurisdiction in § 157(c)(1).
201
  
Further, “[e]ven if the Supreme Court had not already directed a 
more reasonable remedy for the constitutional violation it found in 
Stern, the perverse effect of the remedy suggested by the 
defendants’ argument would require that it be rejected.”202 The 
court, accordingly, denied summary judgment on the core but 
unconstitutional proceeding, preferring to “leave the entry of 
ultimate judgment to the district court.”203 
In Stoebner v. PNY Technologies, Inc. (In re Polaroid 
Corp.),
204
 a Minnesota bankruptcy court held it could not enter 
final judgment in deciding a trustee’s motion for partial summary 
judgment on a breach of contract claim (Count II), which was filed 
in an adversary proceeding after corresponding claims were filed 
against the debtor in the bankruptcy cases, absent parties’ express 
consent. Notwithstanding conflicting statements on the issue of 
consent in the bankruptcy context in Stern, the bankruptcy court 
explained that:  
Absent consent, a presiding bankruptcy judge will have to 
suggest a rationale and a possible outcome to the district 
court, at some appropriate time—if, that is, the outcome 
would be dispositive of Count Two on the present record. 
With consent, a bankruptcy judge would direct entry of 
judgment here, i.e., by the clerk of the bankruptcy court.
205
  
                                                                                                             
 201. Id. at n.1.  
 202. Id.  
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The court accordingly ordered that the parties file express written 
statements as to their consent or non-consent to the entry of final 
judgment by a bankruptcy judge on Count II.
206
 The court was also 
critical of treatment in briefing of the issue as one of jurisdiction, 
when after Stern, it is adjudicatory authority as between the district 
and bankruptcy courts that is at issue; jurisdiction lies in the 
district court.
207
  
In Garden v. Central Nebraska Housing Corp. (In re Roberts), 
the Nebraska Bankruptcy Court considered an interpleader 
complaint filed by the trustee, which requested the reformation of 
mistakes in the legal description of property that was sold after the 
trustee was granted stay relief, in order to quiet title among the 
parties claiming an interest in the property.
208
 The court 
determined that in this chapter 7 case, where the debtor received a 
discharge, the post-discharge fight is between the deed of trust 
trustee and two bidders over the validity of the sale and also among 
creditors claiming an interest in the proceeds therefrom.
209
 Because 
the court determined that the outcome of the litigation was unlikely 
to affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate significantly, it 
concluded that the matter did not arise under title 11, or in a case 
under title 11, and was not related to a case under title 11 and that 
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.
210
 The court 
further explained that Stern “made clear that bankruptcy courts 
should refrain from impinging upon the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Article III courts by entering judgments on state law claims 
involving non-debtor third parties.”211 
In Schmidt v. Klein Bank (In re Schmidt),
212
 the Eighth Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed and remanded a bankruptcy 
court’s ruling that certain replevin actions (which included claims 
for breach of promissory note, breach of personal guaranties, 
breach of security agreement, and replevin, and which were 
asserted against debtors and non-debtor corporations owned by the 
debtors) filed by a bank were core, and thus, the bankruptcy court 
was not required to mandatorily abstain from hearing them. The 
replevin actions had been originally asserted in state court and then 
removed to the bankruptcy court where debtor-principals (and 
guarantors) of the companies sued had filed their individual 
                                                                                                             
 206. Id. at 498.  
 207. Id. at 496–98.  
 208. 2011 WL 3035268, at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. July 19, 2011).  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. at *2 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2594 (2011)).  
 212. 453 B.R. 346 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011).  
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bankruptcy petitions.
213
 The panel made this determination based 
upon Stern. The bankruptcy court had determined that it was not 
required to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) because the 
replevin actions were core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (matters 
concerning the administration of the estate); (B) (the allowance or 
disallowance of claims against the estate); and (O) (other 
proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or 
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder 
relationship).
214
 The panel believed that Stern compelled reversal 
because, even if a matter fits into one of the enumerated examples 
of § 157(b)(2), it must also “arise in a bankruptcy case or under 
title 11.”215 Thus, even if the replevin actions could fit under an 
enumerated category in § 157(b)(2), they were, in essence, only 
related to a case under title 11, and thus, not core.
216
 The court also 
noted that “absent extraordinary circumstances, if a principal 
wishes to use the Bankruptcy Code to protect the assets of its 
corporation, or wants a bankruptcy court to decide causes of action 
against the corporation, it needs to file a bankruptcy case on behalf 
of the corporation.”217 
In In re Fressadi, the Arizona Bankruptcy Court considered a 
motion to convert a debtor’s chapter 11 case to chapter 7.218 After 
considering the entire record in the case, as well as a number of 
adverse judgments entered against the debtor in litigation against 
the debtor that had been removed to the bankruptcy court, the court 
determined that the debtor’s case had been filed in bad faith and 
dismissed it sua sponte.
219
 The court noted that each of the state 
law cases that had been removed to the bankruptcy court would be 
remanded because none of them involved the court’s core 
jurisdiction.
220
 The court loosely stated in a parenthetical that the 
holding of Stern was that it is “unconstitutional for bankruptcy 
courts as Article I courts to adjudicate common and state law 
causes of action which are not part of estate’s counterclaim to 
creditor claim.”221 
In Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Colony Beach & 
Tennis Club Association., Inc. (In re Colony Beach & Tennis Club 
                                                                                                             
 213. Id. at 347.  
 214. Id. at 351.  
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Id.  
 218. 2011 WL 2909375, at *1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 15, 2011).  
 219. Id. at *2–3.  
 220. Id. at n.1.  
 221. Id.  
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Association, Inc.),
222
 a Florida district court on appeal considered 
whether to remand to state court claims relating to a state law issue 
regarding a resort hotel’s obligations to pay for repairs with respect 
to common elements of a beach and tennis club association. The 
bankruptcy court below considered the claims against a debtor to 
be core proceedings because they involved “allowance or 
disallowance of claims against the estate” and “other proceedings 
affecting . . . the adjustment of the debtor-creditor . . . 
relationship.”223 However, because the claims were “purely state 
law claims, asserted in state court,” the court determined that they 
could not qualify as a core proceeding because, if they did, 
“virtually any claim would entitle a bankruptcy court to enter a 
final judgment,” which would run afoul of Marathon and Stern.224 
As a consequence, the district court reviewed the bankruptcy 
court’s findings and conclusions de novo and reversed the 
bankruptcy court on many points of error.
225
  
3. On Avoidance Actions 
In Miller v. Greenwich Capital Financial Products, Inc. (In re 
American Business Financial Services), the Delaware Bankruptcy 
Court considered whether it had jurisdiction after Stern over an 
adversary proceeding in which the trustee asserted fraudulent 
transfer, avoidance, and recovery claims under federal and state 
law as well as fiduciary duty claims.
226
 The court explained that 
many of the counts asserted were core and that no parties objected 
to the court’s final adjudicatory authority.227 The court then noted 
that the decision in Stern “is a ‘narrow one’ which focuses on 
whether the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself.”228 
Here, where the claims arose after the bankruptcy petition was 
filed and “relate[d] entirely to matters integral to the bankruptcy 
case” and where “[i]f not for the bankruptcy, these claims would 
[have] never exist[ed],” the court determined that it had authority 
to hear the proceeding.
229
  
                                                                                                             
 222. 456 B.R. 545 (M.D. Fla. 2011).  
 223. Id. at 551.  
 224. Id. at 552.  
 225. Id. at 552, 566.  
 226. 457 B.R. 314, 319 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).  
 227. Id. at 319 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), 157(b)(2)(B), 
157(b)(2)(E), 157(b)(2)(H), & 157(b)(2)(O)).  
 228. Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011)).  
 229. Id. at 319–20 (citing In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 
117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Nowhere in . . . Stern does the Supreme Court 
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In Springel v. Prosser (In re Innovative Communication 
Corp.), in response to a complaint filed in an adversary proceeding 
initiated by the trustee for the ICC Debtors—which sought 
avoidance of fraudulent conveyances to certain defendant adult 
children of an insider of the debtors—the defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance action.
230
 The defendants 
argued that Stern divested the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to 
determine the fraudulent conveyance action because that action 
involved private, and not public, rights, and “because only an 
Article III Court can adjudicate fraudulent conveyance actions” 
after Stern.
231 
On August 5, 2011, the court denied the motion to 
dismiss,
232
 explaining that the limitation on bankruptcy court 
authority over core proceedings is “narrow” and limited to “one 
isolated respect” as pronounced by the majority in Stern—to state 
law counterclaims, but not to fraudulent conveyances.
233
  
In Meoli v. The Huntington National Bank (In re Teleservices 
Group, Inc.),
234
 the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Michigan considered Huntington’s motion requesting that the court 
amend a pretrial order so as to eliminate its designation of an 
adversary proceeding, over a potentially multi-million dollar 
fraudulent transfer judgment, as a matter in which the bankruptcy 
court was authorized to enter a final order subject only to appellate 
review under Stern.
235
 The court ruled that it lacked the 
constitutional authority to enter such a final judgment.
236
 In 
reaching that conclusion, the judge explained that his confidence in 
his capacity to render “final judgments in many, but not all, 
matters arising in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding” in 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157 was clearly “misplaced,” as 
shown by Stern.
237
 The judge explained his frustration:  
Everyday I am presented with numerous orders that 
Congress expects me to either sign as final or forward on 
with a report and recommendation. However, prior to 
Stern, I did have a standard—28 U.S.C. § 157—to serve as 
                                                                                                             
 
rule that the bankruptcy court may not rule with respect to state law . . . when 
deciding a matter directly and conclusively related to the bankruptcy.”)).  
 230. No. 08-03004, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3040 (Bankr. D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011). 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at *9–10.  
 234. 456 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W. D. Mich. 2011). 
 235. Id. at 321. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id.  
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my guide. But now I am told that that standard is unreliable 
when tested against the Constitution itself.
238
  
The court then proceeded to discuss bankruptcy court authority 
throughout the history of the United States and finally reached the 
following conclusion:  
[W]hile Granfinanciera’s historical references to the 
recovery of fraudulent conveyances and preferences through 
the common law courts offers additional insight, it is not a 
necessary component to my decision that any judgment that 
will enter against Huntington in this adversary proceeding 
must be entered by an Article III judge. Stern, coupled with 
the Court’s earlier decision in Murray’s Lessee, is all that is 
needed to realize that the taking that Trustee has in mind in 
this adversary proceeding requires the oversight of a judicial 
officer with the independence that is only guaranteed by life 
tenure and salary protection.
239
 
The court did, however, note that it believed it “could still enter 
a final judgment against Huntington in this case were Huntington 
and Trustee both to consent.”240 In conclusion, the bankruptcy 
judge lamented:  
Unfortunately, Stern has not only corrected my 
misunderstanding [that Section 157 solved the constitutional 
questions that plagued Bankruptcy Courts post-Marathon] 
but has also raised yet another constitutional problem.
241
 The 
result is that there is no easy solution to what I suspect will 
                                                                                                             
 238. Id. at 322.  
 239. Id. at 338. 
 240. Id.  
 241. The court explained in great detail how Murray’s Lessee created 
another, yet unaddressed, problem. Id. at 344. Not only did the Court in 
Murray’s Lessee, as cited in Stern, explain that “we do not consider congress 
can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, 
is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Id. at 329, 
342, & 344 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 
U.S. 272, 284 (1856)). Murray’s Lessee further explained that “nor, on the other 
hand, can [Congress] bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its 
nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.” Id. at 329. The court was 
troubled by the fact that if the district court is given authority over bankruptcy-
related issues that do not require judicial process (i.e., things a trustee could 
unilaterally do regarding the debtor’s voluntarily handed-over property), would 
it not also, under Murray’s Lessee, be unconstitutional to have an Article III 
court handle a non-judicial issue such as a sale of debtor’s property under 11 
U.S.C. § 363? See id. at 326. 
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be years of uncertainty as the bankruptcy process grinds 
on.
242
 
In In re Klug, a Kentucky bankruptcy court dismissed a 
plaintiff’s state law fraudulent transfer action against a debtor post-
discharge, reasoning that the automatic stay was in place and 
prevented such action where the plaintiff did not seek a lift of the 
stay and because the chapter 7 trustee, who had not abandoned the 
claim, was the only party with standing to assert such claim.
243
 The 
court noted that the defendant contended that the court lacked 
authority under Stern over state law in rem claims, without further 
analysis. However, the court concluded that the proceeding was 
core under § 157(b)(2)(H) without further comment.
244
  
In Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth),
245
 upon considering a 
defendant’s motion for mandatory or permissive abstention and 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine relating to an adversary proceeding to 
set aside a marital settlement agreement between a debtor and her 
former husband and to recover avoidance actions, a Montana 
bankruptcy court considered sua sponte whether it had subject 
matter jurisdiction over equitable subordination and fraudulent 
transfer and preference claims. The court reasoned that it had core 
jurisdiction over equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer 
and preference claims by statute but that such “authority may not 
be exercised unless it is also constitutional.”246 Under Stern, 
“[s]ince bankruptcy courts are neither Article III courts nor 
adjuncts thereof, they generally may not hear claims that must be 
adjudicated by Article III courts.”247 However,  
fraudulent conveyance claims in bankruptcy do not fall 
within the public rights exception as they are 
“quintessentially suits at common law that more nearly 
resemble state law contract claims brought by a bankrupt 
corporation to augment the bankruptcy estate than they do 
creditors’ hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share 
of the bankruptcy res.” Since Trustee’s fraudulent 
conveyance claim is essentially a common law claim 
attempting to augment the estate, does not stem from the 
bankruptcy itself[,] and would not be resolved in the claims 
                                                                                                             
 242. Id. at 326. 
 243. No. 10-53071, 2011 WL 3352468 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2011). 
 244. Id. at *2. 
 245. No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011).  
 246. Id. at *10.  
 247. Id.  
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allowance process, it is a private right that must be 
adjudicated by an Article III court. This Court’s jurisdiction 
over that claim as a core proceeding is therefore 
unconstitutional.
248
  
The court found that equitable subordination and preference 
claims, however, were constitutionally within the court’s 
jurisdiction because they “arise from the claims allowance 
process.”249 The court also explained that “[u]nlike in non-core 
proceedings, a bankruptcy court has no statutory authority to 
render findings of fact and conclusions of law for core proceedings 
that it may not constitutionally hear.”250 Here, the court explained 
that “[w]hile 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) allows a bankruptcy judge to 
render findings and conclusions in ‘a proceeding that is not a core 
proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11,’ no 
other code provision allows bankruptcy judges to do the same in 
core proceedings.”251 Therefore, the court concluded that it lacked 
statutory authority to hear the fraudulent transfer claims at all, as a 
core or a non-core proceeding, and granted the parties 14 days in 
which to move the district court to withdraw its reference.
252
 
Otherwise, the bankruptcy court would dismiss the fraudulent 
conveyance claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
253
 
4. On Federal Bankruptcy Issues 
In In re Franchi Equipment Co., Inc., a Massachusetts 
bankruptcy court considered whether it had jurisdiction to approve 
fees of a chapter 7 trustee and his counsel for services rendered in 
connection with the termination of an ERISA plan and quoted the 
following passage from Stern for an overview of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction: 
The manner in which a bankruptcy judge may act on a 
referred matter depends on the type of proceeding involved. 
Bankruptcy judges may hear and enter final judgments in 
“all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a 
case under title 11.” “Core proceedings include, but are not 
limited to” 16 different types of matters, including 
“counterclaims by [a debtor’s] estate against persons filing 
                                                                                                             
 248. Id. at *11 (quoting Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989); 
citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 U.S. 2594, 2618 (2011)).  
 249. Id.  
 250. Id. at *12.  
 251. Id. (emphasis added).  
 252. Id. 
 253. Id.  
2012] BANKRUPTCY COURTS AFTER STERN 689 
 
 
 
claims against the estate.” Parties may appeal final 
judgments of a bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the 
district court, which reviews them under traditional appellate 
standards. 
  
When a bankruptcy judge determines that a referred 
“proceeding . . . is not a core proceeding but . . . is otherwise 
related to a case under title 11,” the judge may only “submit 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the 
district court.” It is the district court that enters final 
judgment in such cases after reviewing de novo any matter to 
which a party objects.
254
 
The court then determined that it had core jurisdiction over the 
fee award because Congress conferred the responsibilities at issue 
to trustees under Bankruptcy Code § 704(a)(11), and trustees 
“literally ‘arise under’ the Bankruptcy Code.”255 
In deciding whether mandatory abstention was appropriate, the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York said in Little 
Rest Twelve, Inc. v. Visan
256
 that Stern was distinguishable and 
inapplicable to the determination of whether certain claims relating 
to conversion of ownership interests in the debtors were core (after 
being removed to that court from state court and being related to 
Florida bankruptcy proceedings) where the claims at issue were 
not specifically enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 157: “The Supreme 
Court’s decision in [Stern] does not affect this conclusion. Stern 
dealt with a counterclaim by a bankruptcy estate against a person 
filing a claim against the estate, a category of claim explicitly 
identified by statute as core.”257  
In In re Bearing Point,
258
 couching its ruling on a motion 
seeking limited relief from a debtor’s confirmation order as either 
abstention or as relief from the confirmation order, the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the motion 
and ruled that the trustee would not be required to litigate retained 
causes of action against officers and directors stemming from 
certain plan releases in bankruptcy court.
259
 The court based its 
ruling in large part on Stern. After acknowledging (1) that, 
previously in the confirmation order, it had “failed to consider how 
                                                                                                             
 254. 452 B.R. 352, 356 (2011) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 
2603–04 (2011)) (citations omitted).  
 255. Id. at 360. 
 256. 458 B.R. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 257. Id. at 57 n.8. 
 258. 453 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 259. Id. at 490. 
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litigants could tie a case up in knots by exploiting their rights to an 
Article III judge determination when litigation against them is non-
core,” (2) that, after Stern, “it’s fair to assume that it will now be 
argued, that consent, no matter how uncoerced and unequivocal, 
will never again be sufficient for bankruptcy judges ever to issue 
final judgments on non-core matters,” and (3) the potential for 
motions seeking withdrawal of the reference to be filed, the 
bankruptcy court refused to require the trustee to attempt to litigate 
such non-core matters in that court.
260
  
In In re Okwonna-Felix,
261
 the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas confronted the issue of whether to 
approve a compromise relating to the settlement of a lawsuit 
against a company insuring a debtor’s homestead under 
Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The court determined that it had 
jurisdiction over this core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), 
(B), and (O) and distinguished Stern.
262
 The court explained that 
Rule 9019 “gives bankruptcy courts discretion to approve a 
compromise. State law has no equivalent to Bankruptcy Rule 
9019.”263 Moreover, the factors a bankruptcy court considers in 
determining whether to approve a 9019 settlement “have been 
developed entirely by the federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”264  
Accordingly, because the resolution of the Motion is not 
based on state common law, but entirely on federal 
bankruptcy law (both the Rule and the case law instructing 
how to apply the Rule), the holding in Stern is inapplicable, 
and this Court has the constitutional authority to enter a 
final order in this contested matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(a) and (b)(1).
265
  
Alternatively, the court explained that the public rights exception, 
as discussed in Stern, applies because: 
The Bankruptcy Code is a public scheme for restructuring 
debtor-creditor relations, necessarily including “the 
exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s 
property, the equitable distribution of that property among 
the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that gives 
                                                                                                             
 260. Id. at 489–90.  
 261. No. 10-31663, 2011 WL 3421561 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2011). 
 262. Id. at *4.  
 263. Id.  
 264. Id.  
 265. Id.  
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the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from 
further liability for old debts.”266  
A key issue in this case as to whether to approve the settlement 
was whether property of the estate was exempt, which is an issue 
established by the Bankruptcy Code and central to the bankruptcy 
scheme.
267
 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was authorized 
to enter a final order.
268
 
In Sanders v. Muhs (In re Muhs),
269
 the Bankruptcy Court for 
the Southern District of Texas ruled that a debtor’s debt was non-
dischargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(B) because the 
debt was obtained by use of a written statement that was materially 
false as to his financial condition, and the creditor reasonably 
relied on that statement, which the debtor made with the intent to 
deceive.
270
 Before reaching that conclusion, however, the court 
examined its authority under Stern.
271
 The court noted that after 
Stern, a bankruptcy court’s “authority over matters involving state-
law causes of action is particularly questionable.”272 However, the 
court concluded that it “may exercise authority over essential 
bankruptcy matters under the ‘public rights’ exception” under the 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. statement of 
that exception, which maintains that “a right closely integrated into 
a public regulatory scheme may be resolved by a non-Article III 
tribunal.”273  
The Bankruptcy Code is a public scheme for restructuring 
debtor-creditor relations, necessarily including “the 
exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s 
property, the equitable distribution of that property among 
the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that gives 
                                                                                                             
 266. Id. at *5 (quoting Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 
(2006); citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
71 (1982); and contrasting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011) 
(“We noted [in Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the 
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”)).  
 267. In re Okwanna-Felix, 2011 WL 3421561, at *5. 
 268. Id.  
 269. No. 09-10564, 2011 WL 3421546 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011). 
 270. Id. at *6–7. 
 271. Id. at *1.  
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 
593 (1985)).  
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the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from 
further liability for old debts.”274  
Further, there are two overlapping classes of claims that still fall 
within the bankruptcy court’s authority post-Stern: “(1) matters 
invoking the Court’s in rem jurisdiction over the estate and (2) 
disputes over rights created by the Bankruptcy Code as an integral 
part of the public bankruptcy scheme.”275 Here, where the dispute 
arose over the debtor’s right to a discharge and any amounts 
excepted therefrom, and a discharge is established by the 
Bankruptcy Code and central to the bankruptcy scheme, the court 
retained authority to determine the dispute.
276
 
In Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz),
277
 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas considered 
whether a debtor was liable for non-dischargeable debts relating to 
the transfer of assets away from a corporation that could not pay its 
creditors because it was insolvent.
278
 The court concluded that the 
plaintiff failed to establish the liability of the individual debtor for 
the debts of the corporation and thus that there was no debt to 
discharge.
279
 As to the court’s authority, the court explained that 
the dispute was core under § 157(b)(2)(A), (I), and (O).
280
 The 
court noted that Stern limited the pool of matters previously 
subject to bankruptcy court authority and explained that the 
broader applicability of Stern “remains unclear.”281 The court 
determined, as it did in In re Muhs, however, that it had authority 
under Thomas’ “public rights” exception.282 Here, where the 
dispute was over the debtor’s discharge, the right to a discharge is 
central to the public bankruptcy scheme and is established by the 
Bankruptcy Code.
283
 The bankruptcy court also “has the authority 
                                                                                                             
 274. Id. (quoting Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 
(2006); citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
72 (1982); and contrasting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011) 
(“We noted [in Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the 
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”)).  
 275. Id. at *2.  
 276. Id.  
 277. 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).  
 278. Id. at 626. 
 279. Id.  
 280. Id. at 630–31. 
 281. Id. at 631.  
 282. Id. (citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006); 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72 (1982); but 
see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011) (“We noted [in 
Granfinanciera] that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.’”)).   
 283. Id. at 631. 
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to determine when the statutorily established right to a discharge 
does not apply. . . . Such determinations are inextricably tied to the 
bankruptcy scheme and involve adjudication of rights created by 
the Bankruptcy Code.”284 Thus, the court determined that it had 
core adjudicatory authority to enter a final judgment.
285
 
In In re Bigler, LP,
286
 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Texas ruled that it could enter a final order on a dispute 
involving lien priority over assets that were once property of the 
estate.
287
 The court reasoned that such a suit fits within the “public 
rights” exception because “it involves the exercise of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s in rem jurisdiction over the estate.”288 The 
court further explained, as it had in In re Muhs and In re Ritz, that 
it had authority to enter final orders on matters that fall within the 
“public rights” exception.289 The court noted: “In simpler terms if a 
bankruptcy court can enter a final judgment on anything, it would 
be a final order resolving a dispute as to who gets a slice of the pie 
and how big that slice is.”290 Where the dispute arose from an 
express provision of the Plan, the court concluded that the dispute 
also “involve[d] a right created by the Bankruptcy Code—
distribution of property of the estate to creditors pursuant to the 
Plan.”291 
In In re Jordan River Resources, Inc.,
292
 a Michigan 
bankruptcy court had before it a liquidating trust’s objection to 
certain preferred interests asserted by an insider party.
293
 The court 
considered whether based on those asserted interests the interest 
holder was entitled to share in distributions under a confirmed 
plan.
294
 The court, citing to Stern, concluded that it could “enter 
final judgment because the controversy involve[d] claims to a res 
within the court’s jurisdiction (permissibly resolved by a 
bankruptcy judge) rather than a proceeding to augment the estate 
(presumptively within the purview of a life-tenured district judge 
                                                                                                             
 284. Id. at 632.  
 285. Id.  
 286. 458 B.R. 345 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 287. Id. at 369. 
 288. Id.  
 289. Id. (citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006)) 
(emphasis omitted).  However, the court did note that the Supreme Court in 
Stern stated that “we did not mean to suggest that the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations is in fact a public right.” Id. (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. 
Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011)). 
 290. Id. at 370 n.24.  
 291. Id. at 371.  
 292. 455 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011). 
 293. Id. at 660. 
 294. Id.  
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with salary protections under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution).”295 “The court can enter final judgment in this 
matter, subject to appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 158, because 
resolving the Plaintiff’s objection to [the] Preferred Interests 
‘stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved 
in the claims allowance process.’”296  
In In re Ramsey,
297
 an Ohio bankruptcy court determined that 
its “decision [was] within [that] court’s constitutional authority as 
analyzed by” Stern, with respect to a creditor’s motion to lift a stay 
to litigate its claims against the debtor based on state law 
(including breach of contract and fraud), which were filed in state 
court over a year pre-petition, and concluded that it would be 
judicially efficient for the state court to continue its hearings on 
those claims.
298
  
In Palazzola v. City of Toledo (In re Palazzola),
299
 an Ohio 
Bankruptcy Court determined that a count in a complaint asserting 
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights by one 
acting under color of law did not arise under title 11, was not 
“related to” a case under title 11, and would have no effect on the 
administration of the estate, thus, the court lacked jurisdiction over 
the § 1983 claim. The plaintiff argued that the claim arose out of 
the bankruptcy case because “the substantive right created by 
§ 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, that is, the right to be free from 
collection attempts on discharged debts by a creditor post-
discharge, the claim is at least arguably a proceeding ‘arising in’ 
their case under title 11 and, thus, a core proceeding.”300 The court 
explained, however, that in Stern, the Supreme Court “ma[de] clear 
that the statutory authority under § 157 alone is insufficient to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction where the exercise of such 
jurisdiction would be in contravention of Article III of the United 
States Constitution”301 and that the § 1983 action was a personal 
injury tort claim and, thus, was “a suit at common law.”302 
Accordingly, the court dismissed the § 1983 claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.
303
 
                                                                                                             
 295. Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011)).  
 296. Id. (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601).  
 297. No. 10-16609, 2011 WL 2680575 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 7, 2011). 
 298. Id. at *1–2. 
 299. No. 09-37696, 2011 WL 3667624, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 
2011). 
 300. Id. (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605). 
 301. Id. at *4. 
 302. Id. at *6. 
 303. Id.   
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The Chief Judge of the Nebraska Bankruptcy Court entered 
three opinions dealing with Stern, which all arose out of the same 
bankruptcy case: In re AFY, Inc. They will be discussed here as 
AFY I,
304
 AFY II,
305
 and AFY III.
306
  
In AFY I, the court considered whether to dismiss an adversary 
proceeding for lack of jurisdiction under Stern and phrased the 
Stern holding this way:  
the Supreme Court determined that while the bankruptcy 
court had statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(2)(C) to enter final judgment on a counterclaim, it 
lacked the constitutional authority to do so on a state law 
counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on 
a creditor’s proof of claim.307  
The court also noted that Stern’s holding was narrow and that 
Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority “only in ‘one 
isolated respect.’”308 Here,  
This adversary proceeding was filed to identify and force 
the turnover of certain property alleged to be property of 
the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, which constitutes a core 
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E). Further the 
trustee’s right to bring a turnover proceeding is created by 
Title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 542. This court is not deprived of 
subject matter jurisdiction simply because resolution of the 
lawsuit may require the application of state law.
309
  
In AFY II, the same court ruled, where the trustee sought 
payment of a $4.5 million receivable and argued that it was entitled 
to turnover under 11 U.S.C. § 542, that, unlike AFY I, the 
proceeding was not core.
310
 Here, the court phrased the Stern 
holding in a more broad fashion: “[t]he Stern decision 
circumscribes the ability of non-Article III judges to enter final 
judgments on certain types of claims, limiting the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                             
 304. Badami v. Sears (In re AFY, Inc.), No. BK10-40875-TLS, 2011 WL 
3812598 (Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter AFY I]. 
 305. Badami v. Ainsworth Feed Yards, LLC (In re AFY, Inc.), No. BK10-
40875-TLS, 2011 WL 3800120 (Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter 
AFY II]. 
 306. Badami v. Sears Cattle Co. (In re AFY, Inc.), No. BK10-40875-TLS, 
2011 WL 3800041 (Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter AFY III]. 
 307. AFY I, at *1 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011)). 
 308. Id.  
 309. Id. (citing In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, No. 07-30005, 2011 WL 
2837494, at *10–13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011)). 
 310. AFY II, at *2. 
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court’s constitutional authority to do so to core proceedings 
stemming from the bankruptcy itself and actions that ‘would 
necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.’”311 The 
court determined that the proceeding to recover the $4.5 million 
receivable was not subject to turnover in § 542 because under 
§ 542(b), turnover actions apply to debts that are “matured, 
payable on demand, or payable on order.”312 Here, where the 
money sought was not clearly a receivable it was “beyond the 
scope of § 542” and was an action that “normally, would, be 
adjudicated outside of bankruptcy.”313 Thus, the court determined 
that the action did not arise under Title 11, did not arise in the 
bankruptcy case, and would not be resolved in the claims 
allowance process, and therefore that the bankruptcy court was not 
the appropriate forum for the trial.
314
 The bankruptcy court 
accordingly vacated its prior summary judgment on the matter, 
granted defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, and 
recommended that the district court withdraw the reference.
315
 
Similarly to AFY II, the court in AFY III analyzed Stern broadly 
and ruled that it should grant defendant’s motion for relief from 
prior judgment on trustee’s claim for collection of an account 
receivable of just under $300,000, because Stern prevented it from 
entering a final order on a collection action, even though the action 
fell within the ambit of Bankruptcy Code § 542 as a turnover 
action.
316
 The court reasoned that “[w]hile [the action] falls within 
the scope of § 542(b), it nevertheless is simply a collection action . . . 
[that] normally would[] be adjudicated outside of bankruptcy.”317 
The court accordingly granted defendant’s motion for relief from 
judgment, vacated its prior judgment in relevant part, and 
recommended withdrawal of the reference to the district court.
318
 
Unlike AFY II, the court here requested that the district court 
consider its prior order on the matter as proposed findings and 
conclusions to be adopted, entering judgment for the plaintiff.
319
 
In Musich v. Graham (In re Graham),
320
 a Colorado 
bankruptcy court considered the issue of non-dischargeability of 
certain debts of a debtor under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6). Upon 
                                                                                                             
 311. Id. 
 312. Id.  
 313. Id.  
 314. Id.  
 315. Id. at *2. 
 316. AFY III, at *1–2. 
 317. Id. at *2.  
 318. Id.  
 319. Id. at *3.  
 320. 455 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011).  
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concluding that the debt was nondischargeable, the court addressed 
Stern in a footnote. The court explained that Stern  
may put into doubt this Court’s ability and authority to rule 
on this issue because it emanates from an interpretation of 
Colorado civil tort law and criminal law. The alleged 
tortious conduct—the assault and wrongful acts under state 
law—have been fully adjudicated by the state court. This 
Bankruptcy Court is dealing only with the question of 
dischargeability. Moreover, the matter at hand is agreed to 
by the parties to be a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (I) and this matter indeed appears to be 
a ‘core’ proceeding—statutorily and constitutionally—thus, 
this Court believes it can issue this ruling accordingly.
321
  
In FNB Bank v. Carlton (In re Carlton), an Alabama 
bankruptcy court determined that an adversary complaint filed by a 
bank seeking a declaration that it was not prohibited from post-
confirmation foreclosure, and counterclaims asserted by the debtor 
asserting a violation of the confirmation order and claims under the 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), were all “core” proceedings.322 
The court reached the conclusion that each of these matters was 
core because (1) the parties agreed that the adversary complaint 
and the confirmation-order-violation counterclaim were each core 
and (2) the TILA counterclaim  
Involve[d] the allowance of the Bank’s claims—or more 
accurately, the reconsideration of their allowance pursuant 
to § 502(j). If the Debtor is entitled to recover on her TILA 
claims, then the Bank’s allowed claims will be subject to 
set-off via reconsideration under § 502(j). Allowance, and 
likewise reconsideration of allowance, are core proceedings 
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).
323
  
The court noted, however, the following in a footnote: 
The Court is confident of its conclusion that adjudication of 
the TILA claims are within its core jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). However, the Bank did not challenge 
this Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction based on an argument 
that a non-Article III judge does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the TILA claims asserted in the 
counterclaim. Nonetheless, because an adjudication of the 
                                                                                                             
 321. Id. at n.27.  
 322. No. 10–40388–JJR–13, 2011 WL 3799885 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 
2011).  
 323. Id. at *1.  
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TILA claims would be the basis for a reconsideration of 
allowance of the Bank’s claims via setoff, it appears this 
non-Article III judge does in fact have the necessary 
subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final order on the 
TILA claims.
324
 
In In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa
325
 a Florida bankruptcy 
court held that Stern did not prevent it from imposing “lock-up” 
restrictions on the debtors’ business and non-debtor guarantors as 
part of plan confirmation because plan confirmation is a “core” 
proceeding.
326
 The court noted that “the few cases that have 
considered whether confirmation is a core proceeding have 
universally agreed that it is.”327 Here,  
the lock-up provisions are an integral part of the order 
confirming the plan under which the non-debtor guarantors 
will receive the benefit of an injunction protecting them 
from being sued on their guarantees during the term of the 
plan. Unquestionably, the Court’s consideration of such 
terms falls within this Court’s core jurisdiction under 
section 157(b)(2)(L).
328
  
The court reached that conclusion over the debtor’s objection 
based on Stern, noting that “[t]he debtor reads Stern too 
broadly.”329 The court stated the holding of Stern as follows: 
The Supreme Court merely held that Congress exceeded its 
authority under the Constitution in one isolated instance by 
granting bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enter final 
judgments on counterclaims that are not necessarily resolved 
in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim. 
Nothing in Stern limits a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over 
other “core” proceedings. Nor does the Stern Court’s 
reliance on its earlier decision in Granfinanciera somehow 
impose some new limitation on this Court’s jurisdiction that 
has not existed since that case was decided over twenty years 
ago. Besides, parties can still consent—either expressly or 
impliedly—to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction after 
Stern.
330
  
                                                                                                             
 324. Id. at n.5 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011)).  
 325. 456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).  
 326. Id. at 719.  
 327. Id. at 716.  
 328. Id. at 719.  
 329. Id. at 705.   
 330. Id.  
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Before reaching that conclusion, the court engaged in a 
thorough description of the analysis set forth in Stern.
331
 In 
determining that the holding in Stern was narrow, the court 
explained that “[i]n fact, the Supreme Court’s holding does not  
even remove all state-law counterclaims from the bankruptcy 
court’s jurisdiction”332 and stated that “nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion actually limits a bankruptcy court’s authority to 
adjudicate the other ‘core proceedings’ identified in section 
157(b)(2).”333 Interestingly, the court noted that,  
It is understandable that some would view that language [in 
Stern that an issue must stem from the bankruptcy itself or 
be resolved in the claims allowance process in order to be 
“core”] as a new limit on the Court’s constitutional 
authority to finally resolve other “core” proceedings, such 
as fraudulent conveyance or preference actions. But the 
Stern Court’s use of the word “reaffirm” makes clear that 
nothing has changed. The sole issue in Granfinanciera was 
whether the Seventh Amendment conferred on petitioners a 
right to a jury trial in the face of Congress’ decision to 
allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate the claims 
against them. Granfinanciera did not hold that bankruptcy 
courts lack jurisdiction to enter final judgments on 
fraudulent conveyance claims. In fact, the Supreme Court 
went to great lengths to emphasize that the issue was not 
even before it in that case. . . . And the language from 
Granfinanciera that some courts and commentators fear 
may limit bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction—language relied 
on by the Stern court—has been the law for over twenty 
years. Yet, this Court is not aware of a single case during 
the twenty years preceding Stern challenging a bankruptcy 
court’s authority to enter final judgments in fraudulent 
conveyance actions.
334
 
Finally, the court explained that: 
Of course, years from now, the Supreme Court may hold 
that section 157(b)(2)(F) dealing with fraudulent 
conveyances is unconstitutional, just as it did with section 
157(b)(2)(C). But the job of bankruptcy courts is to apply 
the law as it is written and interpreted today. Bankruptcy 
courts should not invalidate a Congressional statute, such 
                                                                                                             
 331. See id. at 707–19.  
 332. Id. at 715.  
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. at 717 (citations omitted).  
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as section 157(b)(2)(F)—or otherwise limit its authority to 
finally resolve other core proceedings—simply because 
dicta in Stern suggests the Supreme Court may do the same 
down the road. The Supreme Court does not ordinarily 
decide important questions of law by cursory dicta. And it 
certainly did not do so in Stern.
335
  
5. On Jurisdictional Determinations 
In The Fairchild Liquidating Trust v. State of New York and the 
New York State Department of Transportation (In re The Fairchild 
Corporation),
336
 the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had before it, 
inter alia, the issue of whether adversary proceedings asserting 
claims for breach of contract and various forms of takings with 
respect to certain property should be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity and noted that 
Stern was “inapplicable” because  
the issue in Stern v. Marshall was when, under the United 
States Constitution, the bankruptcy court could enter a final 
judgment as opposed to proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in a case where subject matter 
jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). As such, 
Stern v. Marshall is not a case about subject matter 
jurisdiction. Rather, it addresses the power of the 
bankruptcy court to enter final orders, assuming that 
subject matter jurisdiction exists.
337
  
The court’s power to enter a final order was not implicated, and 
thus, Stern did not apply.
338
  
In an opinion ruling a bankruptcy court’s remand of a state-law 
removed action non-appealable, the Seventh Circuit in Townsquare 
Media, Inc. v. Brill
339
 briefly addressed the issue of whether 
supplemental jurisdiction would expand a bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction, and, without deciding whether supplemental 
jurisdiction would apply in a bankruptcy context, the court 
explained that supplemental jurisdiction would be “inconsistent 
with the statutory treatment of ‘related to’ jurisdiction (and why 
should supplemental jurisdiction be broader?) and is in tension 
                                                                                                             
 335. Id. at 718 (citations omitted).   
 336. 452 B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).  
 337. Id. at n.14 (citations omitted).  
 338. Id.  
 339. 652 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing, inter alia, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. 
Ct. 2594 (2011)).  
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with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to allow bankruptcy judges 
dispositive authority over state-law claims. But that’s another issue 
we need not resolve.”  
The Seventh Circuit in Matrix IV, Inc. v. American National 
Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago considered whether RICO and 
common law fraud claims were subject to res judicata and/or 
collateral estoppel.
340
 The district court ruled that the claims were 
subject to both res judicata and collateral estoppel because the 
exact claims had been litigated and lost in the bankruptcy 
proceedings.
341
 The circuit court affirmed, though on narrower 
grounds, because:  
the res judicata argument exposes some tension in our 
caselaw and a lopsided circuit split on how claim 
preclusion applies in this context. The Supreme Court’s 
recent decision [in Stern] suggests that resolving the 
conflict may be a bit more complicated than the caselaw 
presently admits. Because collateral estoppel—issue 
preclusion—blocks this new suit in its entirety, we affirm 
on this narrower ground of decision and leave the 
resolution of the conflict for a future case in which it will 
actually matter.
342
 
The doctrine of “res judicata bars not only those issues actually 
decided in the prior suit, but all other issues which could have been 
brought,” while collateral estoppel is narrower as it bars re-
litigation of an issue that was actually litigated previously.
343
 The 
court reached its conclusion because of conflicting case law on the 
subject, including its own precedent, which held that RICO claims, 
which are non-core, are not barred by res judicata as to core claims 
that are already resolved, as compared against the precedent in 
“every other circuit” that has rejected the core/non-core distinction 
for purposes of res judicata.
344
 
The Idaho Bankruptcy Court in In re Clark cited Stern for the 
proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) “is not ‘jurisdictional’ but 
instead addresses where such claims shall be tried.”345  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 340. 649 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2011).   
 341. Id. at 546. 
 342. Id. at 542.  
 343. Id. at 547.  
 344. Id. at 551.  
 345. No. 10–20466–TLM, 2011 WL 3294040, at n.16 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 
29, 2011). 
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6. Minor Citations to Stern 
In Correia v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (In re 
Correia), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit 
determined that a debtor lacked standing to challenge the 
assignment of a mortgage to the bank because the Debtor was not a 
party to the relevant assignment documents.
346
 The court expressly 
declined to “reach the question whether the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction was properly invoked to adjudicate the state law anent 
the foreclosure sale’s validity” and explained that “[h]ere we can 
easily resolve the matter on the merits, without considering 
whether the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction was 
constitutional.”347  
In In re Taylor, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited Stern 
for the proposition that a bankruptcy court’s factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error.
348
 
In a qui tam action relating to a patent marking violation, a 
Pennsylvania district court in Hollander v. Ranbaxy Laboratories, 
Inc. cited Stern for the proposition that “[s]eparation-of-powers 
principles are intended, in part, to protect each branch of 
government from incursion by the others.”349 
A Pennsylvania bankruptcy court in Schatz v. Chase Home 
Finance (In re Schatz) also cited Stern for the three types of 
jurisdiction and quoted Stern for the proposition that “[b]ankruptcy 
judges may hear and enter final judgments on ‘all core proceedings 
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.’” 350 In 
Schatz the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
certain causes of action that subsequently re-vested in the debtor, 
which were not within the “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related 
to” jurisdiction because they were not property of the estate after 
the re-vesting.
351
 
A Virginia bankruptcy court in In re Loy cited Stern for the 
proposition that “[p]arties may appeal final judgments of a 
                                                                                                             
 346. 452 B.R. 319 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011).  
 347. Id. at n.3 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); U.S. v. 
Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The maxim that courts 
should not decide constitutional issues when this can be avoided is as old as the 
Rocky Mountains and embedded in our legal culture for about as long.”)).  
 348. 655 F.3d 274, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 349. No. 10–793, 2011 WL 2787151 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2011).  
 350. 452 B.R. 544, 551 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011).  
 351. Id. at 552.  
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bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the district court, which 
reviews them under traditional appellate standards.”352 
In Kemp v. Segue Distrib., Inc. (In re Kemp), a Louisiana 
bankruptcy court cited Stern for the proposition that there are 
“three types of bankruptcy jurisdiction: ‘arising under,’ ‘arising 
in,’ and ‘related to’ jurisdiction.”353 The court determined that it 
did not have jurisdiction in any of those forms over the issue of 
whether judicial estoppel bars a personal injury action brought by 
debtors, which arose three years after plan confirmation.
354
  
In an order on an omnibus claims objection in In re Pilgrim’s 
Pride Corp., the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court 
stated in a footnote that: 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently suggested in dicta that 
this court might try a personal injury claim by consent, 
including implied consent of the claimant. See Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). However, under the 
order of reference to this court, personal injury claims are 
not referred, and thus, implied consent is not possible.
355
 
In denying the government’s request for a new trial on wire 
fraud charges because the government “forfeited its ability to now 
seek retrial based upon its failure to timely assert the claim that the 
jury had not completed its work by returning the verdicts it did,” a 
Florida district court in United States v. Cabrera
356
 reasoned that 
“there would be no reason to allow the government to prevail if it 
had believed the jury was about to be discharged without 
completing all of its required functions yet remained silent.” The 
court cited Stern for the proposition that “sandbagging, i.e., 
‘remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error 
only if the case does not conclude in his favor’ may result in the 
forfeiture of even constitutional rights.”357  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 352. Nos. 07–51040–FJS, 09–51379–FJS, 2011 WL 2619253, at * 5 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. July 1, 2011). 
 353. No. 03–52422, 2011 WL 3664497, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. La. Aug. 19, 
2011).  
 354. Id. at *6.  
 355. No. 08–45664(DML), 2011 WL 3799835, at n.16 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
Aug. 26, 2011) (citation omitted).    
 356. No. 2:08–cr–94–FtM–99DNF, 2011 WL 2681248 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 
2011). 
 357. Id. at *5 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011)). 
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C. Consent Analysis 
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to enter a final 
order on non-core matters with the consent of the parties: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this 
subsection [dealing with related-to jurisdiction], the district 
court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, 
may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a 
bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter 
appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under 
section 158 of this title.
358
 
The Supreme Court explained in Stern that, although Pierce 
consented to the bankruptcy court’s adjudication of his defamation 
proof of claim,
359
 Pierce did not consent to the adjudication of 
Vickie’s counterclaim, i.e., the tortious interference claim.360 Thus, 
a bankruptcy court’s ability to hear and determine matters related 
to a title 11 case with the consent of all parties, such as the tortious 
interference counterclaim, should be undisturbed after Stern. 
Indeed, many courts applying Stern have expressed the opinion 
that parties may still consent to a bankruptcy court’s 
finaladjudicatory authority over “related to” matters after Stern 
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).
361
  
                                                                                                             
 358. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (emphasis added).  
 359. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2606. 
 360. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607. When confronted with the question of 
whether Pierce consented to the resolution of Vickie’s counterclaim in the 
bankruptcy court, the Court in Stern explained that  
Pierce did not have another forum in which to pursue his claim to 
recover from Vickie’s pre-bankruptcy assets, rather than take his 
chances with whatever funds might remain after the Title 11 
proceedings . . . . [A]s we recognized in Granfinanciera, the notion of 
“consent” does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in 
other contexts.  
Id. at 2614–15, n.8 (emphasis added). Exactly what is meant by the Court’s 
statement that the notion of consent is different in the bankruptcy context is 
unclear; however, earlier in the opinion, the Court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) 
for the proposition that parties may consent to a bankruptcy court’s adjudication, 
so this isolated statement does not appear to undermine that consent statute.  
 361. See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, 456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2011) (parties can still consent—either expressly or impliedly—to a 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction after Stern); In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, 
LLC, 2011 WL 3792406, at *1 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011) (bankruptcy 
court can enter a final order on counterclaims asserted by the debtor (whether or 
not they were otherwise resolvable in the claims adjudication process) based 
upon consent of the parties); Stoebner v. PNY Technologies, Inc. (In re Polaroid 
Corp.), 451 B.R. 493 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2011) (court refused to enter final 
judgment on state law action in adversary proceeding absent consent); Jones v. 
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Yet, some courts are not convinced. In Bearing Point, 
discussed above, Judge Gerber wrote that the Supreme Court found 
Pierce’s consent inadequate for the bankruptcy judge to determine 
the counterclaim, and he further opined that, now, consent may 
never be sufficient for a bankruptcy judge to issue final judgments 
on non-core matters.
362
 But, Judge Gerber appears to have 
overlooked that the consent to which the Supreme Court referred 
concerned Pierce’s defamation claim, not Vickie’s tortious 
interference claim. Indeed, there is no suggestion in the opinion 
that the Supreme Court would have ruled the same way had Pierce 
expressly consented to the bankruptcy court’s entry of a final order 
on the tortious interference claim. The constitutionality of 28 
U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) was not at issue in Stern, and, in fact, the 
Supreme Court cited to § 157(c)(2) with approval regarding the 
bankruptcy court’s determination of the defamation claim.363 
Moreover, the constitutionality of the analogous consent statute in 
the magistrate context (28 U.S.C. § 636(c)) has passed 
constitutional muster in several circuits.
364
 Until the Supreme 
Court affirmatively holds that 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is 
unconstitutional, bankruptcy judges should comfortably preside 
over matters related to a title 11 case if the parties consent. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
Mandel (In re Mandel), 2011 WL 2728415, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. July 12, 
2011) (bankruptcy court did not have constitutional authority to decide a 
counterclaim in the absence of parties’ express consent); NYU Hosps. Ctr. v. 
HRH Consr. LLC (In re HRH Constr. LLC), No. 09–23665(RDD), 2011 WL 
3359576, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011) (bankruptcy court can enter a 
final order on state breach of contract action with consent of the parties); Meoli 
v. The Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Group, Inc.), 456 B.R. 318 
(Bankr. W. D. Mich. 2011) (bankruptcy court would have authority to enter a 
final order in a fraudulent transfer adversary proceeding if the parties consent); 
Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. Martinez (In re Martinez), 2011 WL 2925481, at *1 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 18, 2011) (bankruptcy court can enter final order on 
state law conversion claim and dischargeability issues with parties’ consent).  
 362. See In re Bearing Point, Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 496–97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 363. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 364. See, e.g., Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins 
v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 
(1st Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 
725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. U.S., 721 F.2d 922 
(3d Cir. 1983). A more thorough discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and the 
similarities with § 157(c)(2) appears near the conclusion of this article. 
706 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
D. Rerouting and Increasing Court Traffic  
The ruling will surely increase traffic on district court dockets 
while also increasing bankruptcy courts’ workloads due to 
increased motions for permissive abstention under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(c)(1) and by creditors and motions for withdrawal of 
reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). The ruling might also cause 
district courts to withdraw bankruptcy court reference more 
frequently on their own accord, in an effort to streamline the 
courts’ efforts where possible. Bankruptcy courts may also still 
likely hear state-law claim issues, but they will submit proposed 
findings and conclusions to the district court subject to de novo 
review instead of issuing final orders on them. This means two 
judges will effectively have to decide the factual and legal issues 
instead of one. State courts may also become busier—in order to 
avoid the conflict/confusion, parties may choose to litigate “civil 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising on or related to cases 
under title 11” in a more piecemeal fashion by going to state court 
in the first instance because 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) jurisdiction is 
original, but non-exclusive.
365
 In addition to the published opinions 
discussed supra, the following are further examples.  
In In re Extended Stay, Inc.,
366
 plaintiffs, as trustee for and on 
behalf of the Extended Stay Litigation Trust, moved to withdraw 
the reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to the district court on both 
mandatory and permissive grounds, in light of Stern as well as 
Second Circuit jurisprudence limiting post-confirmation 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. The lawsuits at issue were filed 
by the trustee on behalf of the creditors of Extended Stay, Inc. 
relating to a “disastrous” leveraged buyout, siphoning of funds 
from the debtors to the tune of approximately $2.1 billion to 
Blackstone and over $100 million in improper dividends and 
distributions to post-buyout equity holders and their affiliates.
367
 
By the time of this motion, the debtors’ plan had long been 
confirmed (July 20, 2010), had become effective (October 8, 
2010), and had been substantially consummated.
368
 The trustee 
argued in favor of mandatory withdrawal of the reference, 
notwithstanding the court’s retention of jurisdiction over arising in, 
arising under, and related to matters, explaining that the 
                                                                                                             
 365. Note, however, that “the district courts shall have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).  
 366. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Withdraw 
the Reference, Case No. 09-13764 (JMP), Adv. Pro. No. 11-2255 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011) [Docket No. 19].  
 367. Id. at 2.  
 368. Id. at 4.  
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bankruptcy court’s ability to enter final judgments on lawsuits 
initiated against third parties post-confirmation is constitutionally 
unsettled because of Stern.
369
 Here, the trustee stated that the 
bankruptcy court has, at best, “related to” jurisdiction over the non-
bankruptcy state and federal law claims in the adversary 
proceeding.
370
 Citing Bearing Point, the trustee pointed out that 
administrative and procedural delays and hurdles will obtain if the 
court retains adjudicatory authority over a non-core issue.
371
 Even 
though some of the claims in the adversary proceeding are 
admittedly core (seeking avoidance and recovery of fraudulent 
transfers under the Bankruptcy Code), they are asserted along with 
state law claims as well.
372
 The trustee also argued for permissive 
withdrawal of reference “for cause,” citing Bearing Point, and in 
order to promote judicial efficiency, to prevent delay and cost to 
the parties, and to avoid forum shopping, and because the plan has 
already been confirmed and the court’s jurisdiction was 
lessened.
373
 As of August 2, 2011, the case was referred to the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and on 
November 15, 2011, the district court denied the motion for 
withdrawal of the reference.
374
  
E. Basis of “Core” Determination  
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) also appears to be undermined by Stern: 
The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge’s own 
motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a 
proceeding is a core proceeding under this subsection or is 
a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 
11. A determination that a proceeding is not a core 
proceeding shall not be made solely on the basis that its 
resolution may be affected by State law.
375
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 369. Id. at 5.  
 370. Id. at 8.  
 371. Id. at 10 (citing In re Bearing Point, Inc., 453 B.R. 486 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011)).  
 372. Id. at 10–11.  
 373. Id. at 11.  
 374. Walker, Truesdell, Roth & Assoc. v. The Blackstone Group (In re 
Extended Stay, Inc.), Case No. 11-cv-5394 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011) [Docket 
No. 17].   
 375. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3). 
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F. Settlements and Compromises  
Parties may seek approval of more settlements and 
compromises under Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure in an effort to short-circuit protracted piecemeal 
resolution of issues in bankruptcy cases.  
G. Filing Proofs of Claim  
The Stern opinion reminds us that parties filing proofs of claim 
should think carefully about whether to file them if jurisdiction-
challenging counterclaims could be asserted, considering the 
potential additional expense and delay of resolving such 
counterclaims. Even before Stern, it was well settled that the 
bankruptcy court can hear and determine avoidance actions filed 
against a party who files a proof of claim.
376
 Though it has long 
been questionable whether some avoidance actions fall within the 
bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction,377 the filing of a proof of 
claim tethers the avoidance action to the bankruptcy court’s core 
jurisdiction by way of 11 U.S.C. § 502(d). 
H. Bankruptcy Appellate Panels 
If a single bankruptcy judge lacks the authority to enter certain 
types of final judgments, then the authority of a gathering of three 
bankruptcy judges would be subject to the same constitutional 
infirmity for the same types of matters.  
I. Certification  
In Stern, the Supreme Court appeared bothered by the fact that 
the bankruptcy court granted Vickie a huge award ($425 million) 
based on a determination of “whether Texas recognized a cause of 
action for tortious interference with an inter vivos gift—something 
the Supreme Court of Texas had yet to do.”378 Certification of the 
issue to the Texas Supreme Court for guidance on an unsettled 
issue in Texas law before awarding such a huge sum of money to 
Vickie in a very high profile case might have been helpful. 
Certification is a somewhat extraordinary way to obtain an 
advisory opinion from a state supreme court on an issue of 
                                                                                                             
 376. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966). 
 377. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 378. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610 (2011) (citing In re Marshall, 
275 B.R. 5, 50–51 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).  
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unsettled law, though the existence and parameters of such 
certification vary by state. In Texas, unfortunately, neither the 
bankruptcy court nor the district court would have been entitled to 
certify the question, but the Ninth Circuit grappling with the Stern 
case could have. The Texas Supreme Court allows certification, 
but only from federal courts of appeals.
379
 Also of interest, the 
New York Court of Appeals similarly allows certification from the 
U.S. Supreme Court, a federal court of appeals, or a court of last 
resort of another state.
380
  
J. Are Magistrate Judges Subject to the Same Problems? 
Like the bankruptcy judge, the magistrate judge derives 
jurisdiction and authority by Congressional statute.
381
 Magistrate 
judges are not Article III judges. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) provides that 
the term of a full-time magistrate judge is eight years, and his or 
her salary is the same as a bankruptcy judge. The purpose of the 
magistrate judge is to relieve district judges of certain judicial 
responsibilities that can be separated from their exclusive 
constitutional duties in order to reduce case loads.
382
 To further 
this goal, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), which allows 
the magistrate judge to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or 
nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case. 
Under § 636(c)(4), the district court may, for good cause shown on 
its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by 
any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge 
under the consent statute. 
The bankruptcy consent statute in 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) and 
the magistrate consent statute in 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) are 
arguably so similar that any pronouncements on the 
constitutionality of one statute should apply by analogy to the 
other.
383
 Indeed, the constitutionality of § 636(c)(1) has been 
                                                                                                             
 379. See TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 3-C (“The supreme court and the court of 
criminal appeals have jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified from 
a federal appellate court.”).  
 380. See N. Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b), cl. 9.  
 381. Magistrate judges derive their authority from 28 U.S.C. § 636. There is 
no such thing as a “magistrate court.” The court in which a magistrate judge sits 
is the district court. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (a “bankruptcy court” is a unit of the 
district court). 
 382. U.S. v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 93 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 383. See Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 701 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2011) (“If Stern had destroyed the power of Bankruptcy Judges to enter final 
judgments by consent in non-core but otherwise related proceedings, that would 
have called into question the power of Magistrate Judges . . . to make final 
adjudication by consent . . . .”).  
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challenged on the grounds that a magistrate judge cannot 
constitutionally enter judgments in civil cases even with the 
parties’ consent because a magistrate judge is not an Article III 
judge. Yet, several circuits have held that § 636(c)(1) passes 
constitutional muster.
384
 In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. 
Instromedix, Inc., the Ninth Circuit, en banc, noted that the 
constitutional question to be addressed vis-à-vis Congress’s 
enactment of the consent statute is separation of powers. The Ninth 
Circuit observed that the “standard for determining whether there 
is an improper interference with or delegation of the independent 
power of a branch is whether the alteration prevents or 
substantially impairs performance by the branch of its essential 
role in the constitutional system.”385 The circuit court ultimately 
held that § 636(c)(1) contains “sufficient protection against the 
erosion of judicial power to overcome the constitutional objections 
leveled against it.”386 The court concluded that the Article III 
courts control the magistrate system as a whole.
387
 The selection of 
magistrates and their retention in office is the responsibility of 
Article III judges.
388
 Moreover, the Article III judge can cancel an 
order of reference. These factors led the Ninth Circuit to conclude 
that the reference of civil cases to magistrate judges with the 
consent of parties, subject to careful supervision by Article III 
judges, may serve to strengthen an independent judiciary, not 
undermine it.
389
 
The Article III oversight of magistrate judges discussed in 
Pacemaker is also present with respect to bankruptcy judges.
390
 
Thus, if 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is ever challenged on the 
constitutional ground of separation of powers, Pacemaker should 
provide persuasive authority to argue that § 157(c)(2) is 
constitutional. If Stern is construed as concluding that parties 
cannot consent to the bankruptcy court hearing and determining 
non-core, related to matters, including the tortious interference 
counterclaim in Stern, then the many cases holding that the 
                                                                                                             
 384. See, e.g., Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins 
v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 
(1st Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 
725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. U.S., 721 F.2d 922 
(3d Cir. 1983).  
 385. Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544 (citing Nixon v. Admin. of General Servs., 
433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 545. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. at 546. 
 390. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 154(b), and 157(a), (b)(2)(B), (b)(5), 
(c)(1), and (d).  
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magistrate consent statute passes constitutional muster would also 
be undermined. In Bearing Point, Judge Gerber indeed read Stern 
broadly to opine that 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) may be 
unconstitutional.
391
 But Stern does not address the constitutionality 
of the statute; instead, Stern mentions it with approval with regard 
to Pierce’s consent to the bankruptcy court’s adjudication of his 
defamation claim. The holding in Stern should not be extrapolated 
to speak to the constitutionality of a statute not at issue in that case.  
While the Supreme Court has not had occasion to specifically 
address whether either 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) or 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c)(1) are constitutional, the Supreme Court in Roell v. 
Withrow held that consent under § 636(c)(1) can be implied from a 
party’s conduct during litigation.392 It strains logic to argue that the 
Supreme Court would hold that § 636(c)(1) is unconstitutional in 
light of Roell. In fact, Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent, 
raised constitutional concerns of the majority’s holding in Roell 
but only because such consent, he wrote, should be express.
393
 In 
other words, even the dissent in Roell supports the notion that a 
party may consent to have a non-Article III judge decide a civil 
matter. Thus, any constitutional concerns raised by post-Stern 
cases (or commentators), such as Bearing Point, should be 
ameliorated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Roell, and the 
great weight of circuit court authority upholding the 
constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Does Stern v. Marshall shake the foundation of bankruptcy 
courts? Maybe, maybe not. In the relatively short time between the 
issuance of Stern  and the date of the writing of this article, over 50 
bankruptcy opinions have discussed the case, and articles abound 
on the subject. These opinions and articles have established a wide 
continuum on the subject, and many have observed that it is not yet 
clear what the full ramifications of Stern will be. However, what is 
certain after Stern is that a bankruptcy judge may not enter final 
orders on state law counterclaims that are not otherwise resolved in 
the claims resolution process. Additionally, as a number of post-
Stern courts have held, Stern may even stretch by analogy to stand 
for the more general proposition that a bankruptcy court cannot 
enter judgment without the consent of parties on matters that are in 
substance only “related to” a title 11 case, even if such matters are 
                                                                                                             
 391. See In re Bearing Point, Inc., 435 B.R. 486, 496–97 (2011). 
 392. 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003). 
 393. See id. at 596–97 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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listed in the core proceeding list under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). 
Moreover, there is language in Stern (and Granfinanciera) 
touching on the fundamental issue of the constitutional authority of 
bankruptcy courts that may prove useful to future litigants who 
attempt to use Stern to shake the foundation of bankruptcy courts. 
Until that time, however, it ought to be business as usual in the 
bankruptcy courts.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Counterclaims 5th  July 11, 2011 Turner v. First Cmty. Credit 
Union (In re Turner), 462 
B.R. 214 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.  
2011)—bankruptcy court 
retains authority over 
counterclaim not based on 
state law under “public 
rights” exception. 
Narrow 
Counterclaims 5th  July 12, 2011 Jones v. Mandel (In re 
Mandel), 2011 WL 2728415 
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. July 12, 
2011)—bankruptcy court 
cannot decide restitution 
counterclaim absent consent. 
Expansive 
Counterclaims 7th Aug. 25, 2011 In re Olde Prairie Block 
Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill.  2011)—
bankruptcy court has the 
authority to enter a final order 
on counterclaims asserted by 
the debtor either (1) where the 
parties consented or (2) where 
the counterclaims were 
resolved in the process of 
adjudicating the claims.  
Narrow 
Counterclaims 9th  July 15, 2011 Siegel v. FDIC (In re 
Indymac Bankcorp., Inc.), 
2011 WL 2883012 (C.D. Cal. 
July 15, 2011)—district court 
refused to withdraw reference 
of non-core counterclaim 
under Stern. 
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
State Law Issues 1st Aug. 5, 2011 United Systems Access 
Telecom, Inc. v. N. New 
England Telephone 
Operations, LLC, 456 B.R. 
148 (D. Me.  2011)—
withdrawing reference on 
§ 157(d) grounds based upon 
applicability of FCC 
regulation without reaching 
Stern issue as to whether state 
law applied. 
Cautionary 
State Law Issues  2nd Aug. 2, 2011 NYU Hospitals Ctr. v. HRH 
Constr., LLC (In re HRH 
Constr., LLC), 2011 WL 
3359576, at *6 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011)—
bankruptcy court adjudicated 
on a final basis state breach of 
contract claim removed to the 
district court and referred to 
the bankruptcy court on 
express consent of the parties. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues 2nd  July 18, 2011 In re Salander O’Reilly 
Galleries, 453 B.R. 106 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)—
retained determination over 
property of the estate 
determination 
notwithstanding contrary 
choice of law (international)/ 
arbitration provision.  
Narrow 
State Law Issues 3rd  Aug. 15, 2011 Buffets Holdings, Inc. v. Cal. 
Franchise Tax Board, 455 
B.R. 94 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2011)—issues of validity of 
claims and allowance of 
claims are core issues, and 
bankruptcy court can enter 
final order. 
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
State Law Issues  3rd Aug. 25, 2011 In re The Salem Baptist 
Church of Jenkintown, 455 
B.R. 857, n.6 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2011)—noted that Stern 
extends to common law 
causes of action and that 
bankruptcy courts may not 
decide a common law cause 
of action when the action 
neither derives from nor 
depends on any agency 
regulatory regime. 
Expansive 
State Law Issues 
 
3rd  June 28, 2011 Barnhart v. Demarco (In re 
Demarco), 454 B.R. 343 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa.  2011)—
Stern prevents bankruptcy 
court from hearing non-core 
actions removed to the 
bankruptcy court (here, there 
were no assets in estate for 
distribution).  
Expansive 
State Law Issues 3rd  July 22, 2011 Fed. Ins. Co. v. DBSI (In re 
DBSI, Inc.), 2011 WL 
3022177 (Bankr. D. Del. July 
22, 2011) - declining to enter 
order on issue of D&O 
insurance coverage until 
parties briefed Stern’s impact 
on the issue. 
Cautionary 
State Law Issues 4th July 5, 2011 Cline v. Quicken Loans, 2011 
WL 2633085 (N.D.W. Va. 
July 5, 2011)—applied 
mandatory abstention where 
comity and judicial economy 
did not support retaining state 
law causes of action removed 
to district court, even though 
related proof of claim was 
filed, explaining that the 
proof of claim did not convert 
the claims into a core 
proceeding. 
Expansive 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
State Law Issues  5th Aug. 16, 2011 Sigillito v. Hollander (In re 
Hollander), 2011 WL 
3629479 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 
2011)—remanded case to the 
bankruptcy court for decision 
on whether debtor’s 
representations constituted 
fraud under state law and left 
to the district court the issue 
of whether Stern had any 
applicability. 
Cautionary 
State Law Issues 5th  July 25, 2011 So. La. Ethanol, LLC v. 
Whitney Nat’l Bank (In re 
So. La. Ethanol, LLC), 438 
Fed. Appx. 274 (Bankr. E.D. 
La. 2011)—with respect to 
ruling on MSJ regarding 
validity of lien, court gave 
caveat that to the extent it 
lacked jurisdiction, the 
opinion was to be deemed a 
report and recommendation. 
Cautionary 
State Law Issues 5th Aug. 19, 2011 Rogers v. The CIT 
Group/Equipment Financing, 
Inc. (In re B.C. Rogers 
Poultry, Inc.), 455 B.R. 524 
(Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011)—
because the Fifth Circuit has 
not yet ruled on the reach of 
Stern, the Court entered a 
final order on various state 
law contract and tort claims 
of a debtor in an adversary 
proceeding. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues 5th  July 11, 2011 Christian v. Soo Bin Kim (In 
re Soo Bin Kim), 2011 WL 
2708985 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
July 11, 2011)—denial of 
motion to dismiss probate-
related action under Stern.  
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
State Law Issues 5th  July 22, 2011 In re Crescent Resources, 
LLC, 457 B.R. 506 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 2011)—Stern is 
not applicable to state-law 
privilege issues regarding 
motion to compel turnover of 
documents. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues 5th  Aug. 25, 2011 In re Crusader Energy Group, 
Adv. Pro. No. 09-03141 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 
2011) [Docket Nos. 133, 
134]— Stern is not applicable 
to property of the estate 
determinations. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues  6th Aug. 24, 2011 In re Miller – 2011 WL 
3741846, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio Aug. 24, 2011)—
bankruptcy court can enter a 
final order over property of 
the estate determinations. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues 6th  Aug. 16, 2011 Tibble v. Wells Fargo Bank 
(In re Hudson), 455 B.R. 648 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011)—
lien avoidance is a core issue 
regarding which bankruptcy 
court can enter a final order. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues  6th June 27, 2011 Mason v. Szerwinski (In re 
Szerwinski), 2011 WL 
2551012, at * 1-2 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio June 27, 2011)—
bankruptcy court can resolve 
issues of avoidability of a lien 
based upon state law. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues 6th July 18, 2011 Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Martinez (In re Martinez), 
2011 WL 2925481, at *1 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 18, 
2011)—Stern does not limit 
bankruptcy court’s core 
authority over state law 
conversion claim and issues 
relating to dischargeability. 
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
State Law Issues 7th  June 29, 2011 Dragisic v. Boricich (In re 
Boricich), 2011 WL 2600692 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 29, 
2011)—reserved for further 
consideration issue of 
whether bankruptcy court 
could enter money judgment 
on state law claim in non-
dischargeability action.  
Cautionary 
State Law Issues  7th Aug. 26, 2011 Gecker v. Flynn (In re 
Emerald Casino, Inc.), 459 
B.R. 298 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2011)—Stern’s taking of state 
law counterclaims out of 
bankruptcy courts’ core 
authority means only that a 
bankruptcy judge may 
propose findings and 
conclusions on such matters; 
it does not mean, as espoused 
in Blixseth, that the 
bankruptcy court cannot hear 
such matters at all. 
Narrow 
State Law Issues 8th  July 7, 2011 Stoebner v. PNY Techs., Inc. 
(In re Polaroid Corp.), 451 
B.R. 493 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
2011)—absent consent, a 
bankruptcy court cannot enter 
final judgment on state law 
breach of contract action in 
adversary proceeding. 
Expansive 
State Law Issues 8th  July 19, 2011 Garden v. Cent. Neb. Housing 
Corp. (In re Roberts), 2011 
WL 3035268 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
July 19, 2011)—Stern stands 
for proposition that 
bankruptcy courts should not 
enter judgments on state law 
claims involving third parties. 
Expansive 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
State Law Issues 8th  Aug. 3, 2011 Schmidt v. Klein Bank (In re 
Schmidt), 453 B.R. 346 (8th 
Cir. B.A.P. Aug. 3, 2011)—
bankruptcy court cannot enter 
final order on actions that 
might fit within a category 
listed in § 157(b)(2) where it 
is in essence only related-to 
(re: actions against debtor-
owned non-debtor 
companies). 
Expansive 
State Law Issues 9th  July 15, 2011 In re Fressadi, 2011 WL 
2909375 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
July 15, 2011)—Stern 
requires remand of state court 
actions removed to 
bankruptcy court where 
chapter 7 case dismissed for 
bad faith filing. 
Expansive 
State Law Issues 11th  July 27, 2011 Colony Beach & Tennis Club, 
Ltd. v. Colony Beach & 
Tennis Club Ass’n, Inc. (In re 
Colony Beach & Tennis Club 
Ass’n, Inc.), 456 B.R. 545 
(M.D. Fla. 2011)—purely 
state law claims cannot be 
“core” under Stern. 
Expansive 
 
Avoidance 
Actions 
3rd July 28, 2011 Miller v. Greenwich Capital 
Fin. Prods., Inc. (In re Am. 
Bus. Fin. Servs.), 457 B.R. 
314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)—
Stern is inapplicable to the 
resolution of state and federal 
avoidance actions. 
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Avoidance 
Actions 
3rd  July 6, 2011 Springel v. Prosser (In re 
Innovative Communication 
Corp.), No. 08-03004, 2011 
Bankr. LEXIS 3040 (Bankr. 
D. U.S.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011)—
Stern is not applicable to 
fraudulent conveyance 
determination.  
Narrow 
Avoidance 
Actions 
6th  Aug. 17, 2011 Meoli v. The Huntington 
Nat’l Bank (In re 
Teleservices Group, Inc.), 
456 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2011)—bankruptcy 
court authority is vastly 
undermined by Stern, and 
Court cannot enter final order 
in potentially multi-million 
dollar fraudulent transfer 
adversary proceeding. 
Expansive 
Avoidance 
Actions 
6th Aug. 3, 2011 In re Klug, 2011 WL 
3352468 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 
Aug. 3, 2011)—denying state 
law fraudulent transfer claims 
asserted post-discharge 
because trustee was only 
party with standing to pursue 
and finding the proceeding 
core under § 157(b)(2)(H). 
Narrow 
Avoidance 
Actions 
9th  Aug. 1, 2011 Samson v. Blixseth (In re 
Blixseth), 2011 WL 3274042 
(Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 
2011)—After Stern, 
bankruptcy court cannot even 
hear, much less enter report 
and recommendation on, 
unconstitutional “core” 
matters, including fraudulent 
transfer actions (which are 
“quintessentially suits at 
common law”). 
Expansive 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
2nd June 29, 2011 In re Franchi Equipment Co., 
Inc., 452 B.R. 352 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2011)—bankruptcy 
court has core jurisdiction 
over chapter 7 trustee fee 
award because trustees “arise 
under” the Bankruptcy Code. 
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
2nd July 20, 2011 Little Rest Twelve, Inc. v. 
Visan, 458 B.R. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011)—Stern inapplicable to 
determination of whether 
certain claims relating to 
conversion of ownership 
interests were core where the 
claims at issue were not 
specifically enumerated in 
§ 157.  
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
2nd  July 11, 2011 In re Bearing Point, 453 B.R. 
486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2011)—modifying 
confirmation order to allow 
trustee to pursue non-core 
D&O actions in non-
bankruptcy court forum based 
on Stern.  
Expansive 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
5th Aug. 3, 2011 In re Okwonna-Felix, 2011 
WL 3421561 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 3, 2011)—
bankruptcy court retains final 
authority over 9019 
compromise under “public 
rights” exception. 
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
5th  Aug. 2, 2011 Sanders v. Muhs (In re 
Muhs), 2011 WL 3421546 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 
2011)—bankruptcy court 
retains final authority over 
discharge (a central 
bankruptcy matter) under 
“public rights” exception. 
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
5th  Aug. 4, 2011 Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. 
Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 
623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2011)—bankruptcy court 
retains final authority over 
dischargeability under “public 
rights” exception. 
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
5th Aug. 19, 2011 In re Bigler, L.P., 458 B.R. 
345 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) 
—bankruptcy court retains 
final authority over lien 
priority and distribution of 
property of the estate issues 
under “public rights” 
exception. 
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
6th  Aug. 16, 2011 In re Jordan River Res., Inc., 
455 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2011)—bankruptcy 
court can enter final order on 
determination of whether a 
preferred interest holder was 
entitled to distributions.  
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
6th July 7, 2011 In re Ramsey, WL 2680575, 
at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
July 7, 2011)—bankruptcy 
court retains final authority 
over creditor’s motion to lift 
stay against debtor to litigate 
state law claims in state court, 
which were filed prepetition. 
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
6th Aug. 22, 2011 Palazzola v. City of Toledo 
(In re Palazzola), 2011 WL 
3667624, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio. Aug. 22, 2011)—§ 157 
is insufficient to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction to 
bankruptcy courts where it 
would be unconstitutional to 
do so, and a § 1983 action is a 
personal injury tort claim, and 
thus, a suit at common law, 
not a core proceeding, despite 
the applicability of a debtor’s 
right to be free from 
collection attempts on 
discharged debts under § 524.  
Expansive 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
8th Aug. 18, 2011 Badami v. Sears (In re AFY, 
Inc.) (“AFY I”), 2011 WL 
3812598 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
Aug. 18, 2011)—bankruptcy 
court retains final 
adjudicatory authority over 
turnover action, even if court 
must apply state law. 
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
8th Aug. 18, 2011 Badami v. Ainsworth Feed 
Yards, LLC (In re AFY, Inc.) 
(“AFY II”), 2011 WL 
3800120 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
Aug. 18, 2011)—bankruptcy 
court does not retain final 
adjudicatory authority over 
turnover action where 
property is not “matured, 
payable on demand, or 
payable on order” and thus 
falls outside the ambit of 
§ 542 and where it is really a 
collection action. 
Expansive 
2012] BANKRUPTCY COURTS AFTER STERN 725 
 
 
 
Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
8th Aug. 18, 2011 Badami v. Sears Cattle Co. 
(In re AFY, Inc.) (“AFY 
III”), 2011 WL 3800041 
(Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 
2011)—bankruptcy court 
does not retain final 
adjudicatory authority over 
turnover action even where 
action falls within the ambit 
of § 542 where it is really a 
collection action. 
Expansive 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
10th July 11, 2011 Musich v. Graham (In re 
Graham), 455 B.R. 227 
(Bankr. D. Colo. July 11, 
2011)—bankruptcy court 
retains final authority over 
dischargeability as “core” 
proceeding.  
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
11th Aug. 26, 2011 FNB Bank v. Carlton (In re 
Carlton), 2011 WL 3799885 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 
2011)—counterclaims 
asserting a violation of a 
confirmation order and Truth 
in Lending Act violations 
(which tie to reconsideration 
of the bank’s claims’ 
allowance under § 502(j)) are 
“core” and subject to final 
order of the bankruptcy court. 
Narrow 
Federal 
Bankruptcy 
Issues 
11th Aug. 30, 2011 In re Safety Harbor Resort 
and Spa, 456 B.R. 703 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); 
2011 WL 3841599 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2011)—
Stern does not prevent 
bankruptcy court from 
entering final order on plan 
confirmation dispute as a 
“core” proceeding. 
Narrow 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Jurisdiction 
Determinations 
3rd  July 29, 2011 The Fairchild Liquidating 
Trust v. State of N.Y. and the 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp. 
(In re The Fairchild Corp.), 
452 B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2011)—Stern not applicable 
to issue of alleged lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction due 
to sovereign immunity. 
Narrow 
Jurisdiction 
Determinations 
7th  July 21, 2011 Townsquare Media, Inc. v. 
Brill, 652 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 
2011)—supplemental 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy 
courts, if it even exists, would 
be inconsistent with Stern. 
Expansive 
Jurisdiction 
Determinations 
7th July 28, 2011 Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l 
Bank and Trust Co. of 
Chicago, 649 F.3d 539 (7th 
Cir. 2011)—Stern may 
impact whether the core/non-
core distinction is relevant to 
the applicability of res 
judicata.  
Cautionary 
Jurisdiction 
Determinations 
9th July 29, 2011 In re Clark, 2011 WL 
3294040 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
July 29, 2011)—§ 157(b)(5) 
is not jurisdictional; rather it 
only allocates authority. 
Narrow 
 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
1st June 30, 2011 Correia v. Deutsche Bank 
Nat’l Trust Co. (In re 
Correia), 452 B.R. 319 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011)—
refusing to reach the issue of 
whether bankruptcy court had 
authority over state law 
foreclosure validity dispute 
after Stern. 
Citation 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
3rd Aug. 24, 2011 In re Taylor, 655 F.3d 274 
(3d Cir. 2011)—citing Stern 
for the proposition that a 
bankruptcy court’s factual 
findings are reviewed for 
clear error.  
Citation 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
3rd July 18, 2011 Hollander v. Ranbaxy 
Laboratories, Inc., 2011 WL 
2787151 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 
2011)—citing Stern for the 
proposition that separation of 
powers principles are 
intended, in part, to protect 
each branch of government 
from incursion by the others. 
Citation 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
3rd July 25, 2011 Schatz v. Chase Home 
Finance (In re Schatz), 452 
B.R. 544 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
2011)—citing Stern for its 
description of “arising 
under,” “arising in,” and 
“related to” jurisdiction.  
Citation 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
4th July 1, 2011 In re Loy, 2011 WL 2619253, 
at * 5 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 
1, 2011)—citing Stern for 
proposition that district court 
reviews bankruptcy court 
final orders under traditional 
appellate standards.  
Citation 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
5th Aug. 19, 2011 Kemp v. Segue Distrib., Inc. 
(In re Kemp), 2011 WL 
3664497, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. 
La. Aug. 19, 2011)—citing 
Stern for its description of 
“arising under,” “arising in,” 
and “related to” jurisdiction. 
Citation 
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Subject Circuit Decision 
Date 
Case/Comment Holding 
Type 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
5th Aug. 26, 2011 In re Pilgrim’s Pride, Corp., 
2011 WL 3799835 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)—
rejecting Supreme Court’s 
suggestion in Stern that a 
bankruptcy court might try a 
personal injury claim by 
consent. 
Citation 
Minor Citations 
to Stern 
11th July 11, 2011 United States v. Cabrera, 
2011 WL 2681248 (M.D. Fla. 
July 11, 2011)—citing Stern 
for the proposition that if a 
party remains silent about an 
objection, he may forfeit even 
constitutional rights. 
Citation 
 
 
